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 My dissertation consists of three main parts. In the first part, I provide a literature review 
discussing the history of campaign finance law in the United States, the literature examining the 
determinants of corporate political spending, the literature examining the influence of political 
concerns on investing decisions, and the literature applicable to the disclosure of corporate political 
spending. This part is intended to provide the reader with a broad base of information to better 
understand the context of my experimental study in the second part. 
 In the second part, I present an experimental study examining how investors react to the 
disclosure of corporate political spending. In the ongoing debate over whether public companies 
should be required to disclose their political spending, one frequent argument against requiring 
disclosure is that investors do not consider political spending information relevant for their 
decisions. However, I predict and find in my experiment that investors whose political identities 
are aligned with a company’s political spending assess the company as more attractive and invest 
more in the company than investors whose political identities are misaligned with the political 
spending. Interestingly, this effect stems from the negative reactions of misaligned investors. The 
attractiveness assessments and investment amounts of misaligned investors are significantly lower 
than those of investors in a control condition with no political spending disclosure, but those of 
aligned investors are not significantly different from those in the control condition. My results also 
provide evidence that investors use political spending information consciously rather than because 
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of a subconscious bias. These findings have implications for regulators because, contrary to the 
argument that political spending information is irrelevant to investors, my results suggest that 
investors consciously use political spending information in their investment decisions. 
In the third part, I discuss future research possibilities on corporate political spending 
disclosure. I outline research questions that would extend my experimental study, and I identify 
research questions related to managerial decision-making about corporate political spending and 
its disclosure. Finally, I note the importance of also considering the effects of corporate political 
spending disclosure on other stakeholders such as suppliers and customers.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Corporate political spending is a topic that has only recently been broached by accounting 
researchers (Lu et al. 2014, Baloria et al. 2016) but that has been debated vigorously in the legal 
field since the Citizens United decision in 2010 (Bebchuk and Jackson 2012). In this dissertation, 
I aim to inform the reader about corporate political spending and its disclosure, to provide evidence 
that disclosing information about corporate political spending can affect investors’ decisions, and 
to discuss future research opportunities involving corporate political spending and its disclosure.  
 In chapter 2, I provide a broad literature review pertaining to corporate political spending 
and its disclosure. I start with a history of campaign finance law in the United States to describe 
the context in which the current corporate political spending situation developed. Then, I discuss 
the literature on the determinants of corporate political spending, which is dominated by two 
explanations: strategic investment and agency problems. Next, I review the literature that has 
examined political influences on investor decision-making. Finally, I discuss the literature on 
disclosure as it pertains to corporate political spending.  
 In chapter 3, I present my experimental study providing evidence that investors use 
corporate political spending information when it is available and that their use of this information 
depends on the alignment or misalignment of their political identities with the politics being funded 
by the corporation. I predict and find in my experiment that investors whose political identities are 
aligned with a company’s political spending assess the company as more attractive and invest more 
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in the company than investors whose political identities are misaligned with the political spending. 
This effect stems from the negative reactions of misaligned investors. I also provide evidence that 
investors use the political spending information consciously rather than having a subconscious 
bias.  
In chapter 4, I discuss opportunities for future research in the area of corporate political 
spending and its disclosure. I elaborate upon a few additional research questions that could be 
addressed by extending my study from chapter 3. Additionally, I present questions regarding 
managers’ decision-making on corporate political spending and its disclosure, and I consider what 
the effects of corporate political spending disclosure might be on other stakeholders such as 
suppliers and customers. 
 
 3 
2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of political spending in the United States pre-dates the formation of the country as an 
independent nation. In his 1755 race for the Virginia House of Burgesses, George Washington 
refused to buy what was then a customary offering of food and alcohol for the voters on election 
day. He lost that election, and subsequently in the 1757 election, he provided 160 gallons of 
alcoholic beverages to a group of 391 voters. He won that time, but the House of Burgesses went 
on to outlaw the practice of wining and dining voters for votes shortly thereafter (Toedtman 2012, 
Brusoe 2016).   
 Although that could be seen as just a humorous anecdote, the influence of money in 
American politics has been present since those pre-revolutionary days and continued in ebbs and 
flows in the centuries that followed. In 1828, Andrew Jackson became the first presidential 
candidate to run what modern Americans would recognize as a campaign, with two campaign 
offices and the distribution of pamphlets. After his election, he also made sure that some of his 
supporters found roles in the federal government (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). Later, 
prior to his successful presidential campaign, Abraham Lincoln went so far as to purchase a 
newspaper in his home state of Illinois and contracted with its publisher terms stating that, “the 
paper must publish weekly and support the Republican Party.” After being elected, Lincoln sold 
the paper and gave its publisher a role in government as “special consul to Vienna” (Brusoe 2016). 
 Despite these questionable practices, it was not until 1867 that Congress passed the first 
law pertaining to federal campaign finance. In the Naval Appropriations Bill, federal officials were 
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prohibited from seeking political contributions from naval yard workers (“Money-in-Politics 
Timeline” 2017). Then, in 1881, James Garfield was assassinated by a man whom he had rejected 
for a government position, and by 1883, the Civil Service Reform Act extended the prior 
prohibition to cover soliciting money from “any civil service workers” and made it illegal to grant 
civil service positions for reasons other than merit (Fuller 2014). With kickback schemes outlawed, 
corporations became an even more important player in elections with the 1896 McKinley 
campaign raising more than $6 million of its $16 million in contributions from corporations that 
had been persuaded by its pro-business platform. This corporate support of politics continued 
through the 1904 presidential election with Theodore Roosevelt benefiting from and then 
subsequently denouncing corporate political contributions. He called on Congress to ban them, 
and in 1907 the Tillman Act was passed banning all campaign contributions from corporations and 
national banks (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). 
 That legislation was followed in 1910 by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that 
required campaign finance disclosure from all members of the House of Representatives. The 
FCPA was then amended in 1911 to extend the required disclosure to all members of the Senate, 
as well as to candidates in congressional primary races. Per member spending limits were also 
introduced with the amendment (Fuller 2014). It did not take long, however, before the Act was 
challenged. In 1918, Henry Ford lost a primary race to be the Republican senatorial candidate from 
Michigan and accused his opponent Truman Handy Newberry of violating the FCPA. Newberry 
was convicted of the violation and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. In 1921, in 
Newberry v. United States, the Court held that Congress could not regulate primaries, exonerating 
Newberry (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017, “The Election Case” 2017). In the wake of the 
Teapot Dome scandal, the FCPA was amended once more in 1925 to broaden filing requirements, 
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make filings quarterly, and require the disclosure of any contributions over $100. However, the 
law continued to be ineffective as, “there were no penalties for failing to file” (Fuller 2014, 
“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). In reality, Congress did not collect the filings required under 
this amendment until 1967, and even then, the Department of Justice failed to take action on 
reported violations of the law (“Important Dates” 2014).  
More groups were excluded from making political contributions as time passed. In 1935, 
the Public Utilities Holding Act prevented public utilities from giving to political campaigns 
(“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). In 1943, the Smith-Connally Act banned labor unions from 
giving to political campaigns. This move led the Congress of Industrial Organizations, a labor 
union, to create the first political action committee, or PAC. With a PAC, the union could subvert 
the new law by having a separate entity collect voluntary donations from members whose union 
dues could no longer be used toward political contributions (Fuller 2014, “Money-in-Politics 
Timeline” 2017). Then, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act “made permanent the ban on contributions 
to federal candidates from unions, corporations, and interstate banks, and extended the prohibition 
to include primaries as well as general elections” (“Important Dates” 2014). The Act also outlawed 
“independent expenditures” by these entities, precluding them from political spending altogether 
(Fuller 2014). 
In 1971, Congress finally passed legislation intended to address federal campaign finance 
as a whole. With the Federal Election Campaign Act, FECA, most of the FCPA was superseded, 
and an array of new rules came into place. The FECA applied to “primaries, runoffs, general 
elections, and conventions” (“Important Dates” 2014). It increased the scope and frequency of 
required reporting and introduced spending limits for some kinds of campaign advertising. It also 
explicitly permitted “corporations and unions to use their own treasury funds to establish, operate, 
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and solicit voluntary contributions for PACs” (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). Concurrently, 
Congress also passed the 1971 Revenue Act which established a “public campaign fund for eligible 
presidential candidates” by including a check-box on federal income tax returns such that 
taxpayers could direct $1 to the fund (“Important Dates” 2014). 
At first, enforcement of the new rules under FECA was distributed among several different 
government offices, but the aftermath of the Watergate scandal brought an amendment to FECA 
in 1974 creating the Federal Election Commission, or FEC, to take over that role (“Money-in-
Politics Timeline” 2017). The 1974 amendment also expanded the public financing of presidential 
campaigns and introduced more spending limits on federal election campaigns (“Important Dates” 
2014). However, the new law did not stand for long before facing a challenge. Just two years later 
in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that some contribution limits were justifiable but 
spending limits were a violation of First Amendment rights (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). 
Furthermore, the Court provided an opening to corporations and unions by allowing them to 
sponsor “issue advocacy” advertising as long as it did not explicitly mention the election or defeat 
of a particular candidate (Beatty 2007). 
This served as a harbinger of things to come with two more Supreme Court cases 
questioning what corporations could do with respect to election advertising. In 1986, the FEC 
brought a case against a 501(c)(4) not-for-profit corporation called Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, Inc, or MCFL. The group had published a “voter’s guide” to endorse specific pro-life 
candidates, ostensibly violating the rules against corporations paying for explicit election 
advertising. However, the Court held that, “the law in question was unconstitutional as applied to 
MCFL because the organization was created in order to disseminate political ideas, wasn't a for-
profit corporation and didn't accept contributions from for-profit corporations” (“Money-in-
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Politics Timeline” 2017). With this exception established, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 
another not-for-profit corporation, challenged the applicability of an election advertising ban to its 
efforts. In 1990, the Supreme Court considered the case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce and held that the exception granted to MCFL did not apply there because the Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce collected dues from for-profit corporations (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 
2017). 
Then, in 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BCRA, also known as the McCain-
Feingold Act, was passed. Although the main thrust of the legislation was to ban the “soft money” 
raised by political parties outside the oversight of the FEC, BCRA also tightened restraints on 
political advertising by corporations and unions that had been exploiting the letter of the law from 
the Buckley v. Valeo decision (Jones 2017). Corporations and unions had strongly implied their 
political endorsements through the issue-related advertising they were allowed, and BCRA put an 
end to these “electioneering communications” that endorsed or denounced a federal candidate 
(Jones 2017). BCRA was “immediately challenged” in McConnell v. FEC, but in 2003 the 
Supreme Court upheld the law’s major provisions (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). However, 
by 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life, a not-for-profit corporation, ran advertisements that appeared 
to oppose the re-election of Russ Feingold, who ironically had co-sponsored BCRA. A lawsuit 
followed, and in 2007 the Supreme Court considered the case of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life. 
The Court ruled in favor of Wisconsin Right to Life with the majority opinion specifying that the 
only advertisements that corporations and unions could be prohibited from running would be those 
“susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate” (Beatty 2007). 
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Even this lax version of the ban on political advertising by corporations and unions only 
lasted a few years. In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC dismantled 
much of the restrictions that had been placed on corporate and union political spending. Citizens 
United, a non-profit corporation, had produced a movie, “Hillary: The Movie,” that the FEC 
deemed to be an electioneering communication, a violation of BCRA (Hamilton 2010). On appeal 
to the Supreme Court, Citizens United prevailed. The majority opinion did not deny that the movie 
was an electioneering communication but instead struck down the section of BCRA that had 
prohibited them stating that the prohibition had infringed upon the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech. Furthermore, the decision in the earlier Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce case was overturned (Hamilton 2010). The Court effectively granted corporations and 
unions the right to spend unlimited amounts on political advertising as long as they did so 
independently of the candidates and political parties (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). 
Nonetheless, the Court did maintain the ban on “direct corporate contributions to candidates” 
(Hamilton 2010). In a related case a few months later, Speechnow.org v. FEC, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals cited the recent Supreme Court decision in deciding that “unlimited independent 
expenditures” could not be linked to corruption risk (Fuller 2014). Thus, contributions to groups 
such as PACs and 501(c) organizations could not be limited, creating the legal room for 
SuperPACs that can receive and spend unlimited amounts (Liptak 2010).  
These decisions also created the possibility of untraceable “dark money” political spending 
through 501(c) groups, which may have been an unintentional consequence. “Some experts believe 
that the Supreme Court did not realize that lax interpretation of the laws governing independent 
expenditures by the FEC and political activity of tax-exempt organizations by the IRS meant that 
transparency would not be guaranteed” (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). Nonetheless, the 
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Court saw a challenge to its Citizens United v. FEC decision the very next year in American 
Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock and held to its position, this time extending the recent 
precedent to cover state elections as well (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). 
Most recently, the Supreme Court held in 2014 in the case of McCutcheon v. FEC that the 
limit on individuals’ aggregate contributions across all candidates, parties, and PACs was 
unconstitutional, again citing the First Amendment (“Money-in-Politics Timeline” 2017). 
Although this limit did not constrain many donors, its removal does clear the path for those wealthy 
donors to spend more on elections especially through PACs, which can be created without limit 
(Fuller 2014). However, also in 2014, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case of Iowa Right 
to Life Committee v. Tooker, in which a lower court had held that Iowa’s ban on direct corporate 
contributions to candidates and committees should stay in place (Hurley 2014). In rejecting the 
case, the Court allowed the federal ban on such direct corporate contributions to continue as well. 
       
 
               
    
2.2 THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING 
I now discuss the literature as it pertains to the determinants of corporate political spending. Two 
general positions on corporate political spending have been put forth in the literature. One holds 
that corporate political spending is strategic and has benefits for the firms that engage in it. The 
other regards corporate political spending as being symptomatic of agency problems with 
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corporate executives using the firm’s money to support their own interests rather than the best 
interests of the firm. I first discuss the studies arguing that corporate political spending is strategic 
and then discuss the studies arguing that it is the result of an agency problem. 
2.2.1 Corporate Political Spending as a Strategic Investment 
Prior research has shown that firms with politically connected directors experience benefits. 
Although none of these studies specifically examines corporate political spending, I mention them 
first because they may relate to corporate political spending through a path I discuss in the next 
paragraph. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008) examine the stock market performance of firms with 
directors who have political connections. First, the authors show that the addition of a politically 
connected director to a firm’s board results in positive abnormal returns for the firm’s stock. 
Second, they show that after the US presidential election in 2000 firms with directors who have 
Republican connections gain in market value while firms with directors who have Democratic 
connections decline in market value (Goldman et al. 2008). Consistent with that finding, Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2013) show that after the 1994 Congressional elections, which resulted in the 
Republicans taking control of the House and the Senate from the Democrats, firms with 
Republican-connected directors gained government procurement contracts while firms with 
Democrat-connected directors lost government procurement contracts. Also, companies with 
politically connected directors get lower interest rates and better terms on bank loans (Houston, 
Jiang, Lin, and Ma 2014).  
Lu, Shailer, and Wilson (2016) show that in Australia director networks influence firms’ 
political spending. In Australia, there is no limit on how much money a corporation can donate to 
political parties, and all political donations beyond a relatively low threshold are required to be 
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reported. In this setting, the authors confirm that directors’ professional networks, through 
corporate board interlocks, and non-professional networks, through non-profit board interlocks, 
affect their firms’ political spending. Specifically, firms spend more on political donations if their 
directors are connected with directors of other firms that spend on political donations (Lu et al. 
2016). Although this result has not yet been shown for US firms, where much of firms’ political 
spending may not be disclosed, it is plausible that a similar effect could exist in the US. Thus, if 
directors exert some control over their firms’ political spending, the benefits documented in the 
studies of politically connected directors may be due in part to their firms’ political spending, 
which they have influenced. I may be the first to explicitly propose this mediating path between 
politically connected directors and the benefits their firms receive. 
Moving on to research showing direct relationships between political spending and benefits 
to firms, Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010, p. 687) analyze data “of firm-level contributions 
to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004.” The authors examine firm PAC contributions to 
political candidates and create a measure of the sum of the candidates that a firm supported through 
its PAC during a rolling five-year window. They find “a strong and robust correlation between this 
contribution measure and a firm’s future abnormal returns” (Cooper et al. 2010, p. 718). That is, 
firms that support more political candidates generally have higher abnormal stock returns. This 
relationship is found to be particularly strong for firms that support more candidates in the states 
in which they are headquartered, for firms that support more candidates for House seats, and for 
firms that support more Democrats. There is also a significant positive relationship between the 
political contribution measure and firms’ future profitability such that a larger number of political 
candidates supported predicts a higher future return on equity for the firm. Further analyzing the 
abnormal stock returns, the authors note that if one only considers the firms’ PAC contributions, 
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which averaged $23,471 per year over the sample period, this relationship implies “an extremely 
high rate of return,” with firms having an average abnormal increase in shareholder wealth of 
$163.8 million per year (Cooper et al. 2010, p. 719). However, the authors speculate that the actual 
costs of currying political favor may be much higher considering that lobbying expenses are “20 
to 60 times more” than PAC contributions and firms may also take other costly actions to build 
their political relationships (Cooper et al. 2010, p. 719). 
Another study considers firm PAC contributions and comes to a similar conclusion about 
the effect on firm value through a novel approach. Akey (2015) examines the relationship between 
firm PAC contributions and abnormal equity returns in the context of close-call congressional 
elections in the US. Specifically, the author limits his analysis to congressional elections that were 
won by a margin of 5% or less, compared to the median election during the 1998-2010 period 
being won by 33% of the vote. Elections in this sample are thought to be more likely to have been 
uncertain ex-ante, thus increasing the chance of a postelection stock market reaction. Akey (2015, 
p. 3220) first looks at special elections, held to replace a member of Congress who has left before 
the end of his or her term, and finds “a causal effect of connectedness on firm value that is larger 
than estimates previously reported in the literature.” The author’s use of the word “connectedness” 
denotes his view that firm PAC contributions are just a proxy for how connected to a politician the 
firm is (Akey 2015). In a similar analysis using general elections to provide a larger sample, the 
effect size appears to be smaller, but the general finding holds: “On election days, the market reacts 
positively if a firm is connected to winning politicians and negatively if it is connected to losing 
politicians, but the magnitudes are smaller than for special elections” (Akey 2015, p. 3220). The 
study rules out politicians favoring particular industries or regions as an explanation for the effect. 
Furthermore, the study shows that stock market reactions are even stronger for the portion of 
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contributions that went to “senior politicians’ leadership PACs,” what the author calls “indirect 
connections” (Akey 2015, p. 3220). These are firm PAC contributions that went to a more senior 
politician’s PAC before going to support the candidate in the election. The author argues that the 
stronger effect makes sense due to the discretion these leadership PACs have over allocating funds 
to candidates. Simply put, “senior politicians may be able to influence party members in ways that 
firms cannot” (Akey 2015, p. 3220). Finally, similar to the Cooper et al. (2010) finding regarding 
return on equity, Akey (2015) finds that firms’ fundamentals improve as a result of their political 
connections with future sales being positively affected by the firms’ PAC contributions to winning 
candidates. 
Along with these studies documenting positive correlations between corporate political 
spending and stock returns, other studies document more overt benefits to corporate political 
spending in the form of diminished government regulation. Correia (2014) examines SEC 
enforcement actions and penalties as a function of firm PAC contributions and lobbying expenses. 
Using a sample of firm-years during which firms have had to restate their financial statements, she 
finds that firms are less likely to face enforcement actions from the SEC in proportion to their 
history of PAC contributions. She finds a similar result for firms’ lobbying expenses affecting the 
likelihood of enforcement, but interestingly her analyses of the effects on penalties for firms that 
come under enforcement actions show that only PAC contributions lead to lower penalties. In other 
words, firms with “long-term PAC contributions” appear to have developed political relationships 
that lower their chances of facing enforcement actions and lower the penalties associated with 
these actions if they arise (Correia 2014, p. 259). Consistent with the political relationship story, 
the study also notes that focusing on firm PAC contributions to politicians who are in better 
positions to pressure the SEC, such as being in the majority party or being on certain committees, 
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yields even lower likelihoods of enforcement actions and lower penalties. In explaining the study’s 
results, the author notes two possibilities. The firms’ political contributions could lead to the 
politicians intervening on behalf of the firms, or they could just signal the firms’ “willingness to 
fight the SEC’s enforcement decision” (Correia 2014, p. 259). Either way, the study shows that 
“the SEC is influenced by considerations other than the merits of the case” (Correia 2014, p. 259). 
Similarly, there is evidence that corporate political spending may decrease firms’ tax 
burdens. Brown, Drake, and Wellman (2015) show that firms’ long-term political spending can 
benefit them through reduced tax rates. They explicitly position their study as “providing an 
economic link for the observed contribution-return relation documented in Cooper, Gulen, and 
Ovtchinnikov (2010)” (Brown et al. 2015, p. 69). The study uses measures of firm PAC 
contributions similar to those used in Cooper et al. (2010) except that these measures only focus 
on contributions to members of congressional tax-writing committees. The authors find that firms 
that provide PAC contributions to tax-writing members of Congress have lower future effective 
tax rates (ETRs) than firms that do not, and this relationship is strengthened by the number of 
candidates supported and the length of time over which the support is consistently provided 
(Brown et al. 2015). Further, limiting the sample to only firms that have PACs, the number of 
candidates supported and the length of the support given both continue to have negative 
relationships with both future cash and GAAP ETRs. As an example, “supporting approximately 
5.25 additional tax-writing members of Congress, is associated with a 1.69 percent lower future 
cash ETR and a 1.66 percent lower future GAAP ETR (approximately $33 million in tax savings)” 
(Brown et al. 2015). Using the same independent measures, the authors also document a negative 
relationship with volatility in firms’ future cash ETRs. Essentially, firms benefit in proportion to 
the number of candidates they support and the length of time they support them by receiving not 
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only lower tax rates but also more consistent taxation year to year. Drawing on theory about a 
“relational approach to political strategy” to explain their main results, the authors predict and find 
significant negative interactions between their two measures of political support and a measure of 
lobbying activity on both future cash and GAAP ETRs (Brown et al. 2015). That is, the study 
shows that the effects of firms’ PAC contributions and firms’ lobbying activities have a 
complementary relationship in regard to lowering firms’ tax rates. The authors argue that this is 
consistent with a story wherein the firm uses its political spending to increase access for its 
lobbying efforts (Brown et al. 2015). 
In studies that complement Brown et al. (2015) well, Kim and Zhang (2016) and Baloria 
and Klassen (2017) report evidence that firms behave strategically regarding their political 
connections and tax choices. Kim and Zhang (2016) use three different measures of firm political 
connections, including whether a firm had a PAC, to show that tax aggressiveness is greater among 
politically connected firms, regardless of the measures used for both political connections and tax 
aggressiveness. The authors control for “other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and 
year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected,” and they ultimately 
conclude that their results are consistent with several possible explanations in which firms benefit, 
or at least expect to benefit, from their political connections (Kim and Zhang 2016, p. 78). Related, 
Baloria and Klassen (2017, p. 1) focus on the behavior of “firms that contributed to congressional 
candidates who favor reductions in the U.S. corporate statutory tax rate.” Using data from the 2012 
election, the authors find that these firms managed their effective tax rates upward by an average 
of 3% in the two quarters prior to the election. They find evidence consistent with the idea that the 
increases in ETRs were intended “to improve their candidate’s prospects by avoiding the release 
of damaging information” (Baloria and Klassen 2017, p. 18). Specifically, firms engaged in greater 
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ETR management when they had stronger relationships with their supported candidates, as proxied 
by geographic co-location and same party affiliation, and when their supported candidates were in 
more competitive races (Baloria and Klassen 2017). 
Taken together, the studies arguing for corporate political spending as a strategy provide 
evidence that firms’ political contributions benefit them both in terms of stock market reaction and 
underlying economic realities. Furthermore, it appears that some of the economic benefits to these 
firms happen through straightforward regulatory channels, with firms having less reason to fear 
the SEC and IRS. However, other studies have shown negative results for firms engaged in 
corporate political spending, and I discuss that literature next. 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Political Spending as an Agency Problem  
Coates (2012) suggests that much, but not all, corporate political activity is a value-destroying 
misuse of executive power. The author acknowledges early in the paper that in industries subject 
to government regulation and/or reliant on government spending, “it seems hard to imagine that 
shareholders of any given firm would benefit from unilateral political disarmament” (Coates 2012, 
p. 658). He then argues that these industries may drive the findings of Cooper et al. (2010), which 
he asserts did not properly control for industry in some analyses. Using data from S&P 500 firms 
and measures of corporate political activity based on firms’ PAC spending and lobbying expenses, 
Coates (2012) goes on to document a variety of concerning relationships involving corporate 
political activity, or CPA. The study shows that CPA is negatively correlated with both ownership 
concentration and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms in which shareholders have relatively 
weak control spend more on CPA. CPA is positively correlated with CEOs’ personal use of 
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corporate jets and with CEOs retiring to assume a political appointment or run for political office, 
suggesting that CPA is at least correlated with agency costs and may be an agency cost itself. 
Notably, the author clarifies that the relationships just mentioned “are weakest (or even reversed) 
in heavily regulated or government-dependent industries, and strongest in other industries” (Coates 
2012, p. 688). Similarly, CPA is negatively associated with firm value, but this effect is “weakest 
(or even positive)” in those regulated or government-dependent industries (Coates 2012, p. 688). 
Worryingly, the study finds that after the Citizens United decision CPA increased most strongly 
among firms that are not in heavily regulated or government-dependent industries. As an example, 
while firms’ PAC spending went up overall after Citizens United, the PAC spending of firms in 
heavily regulated industries declined. The author finds this trend to be indicative of an increase in 
the problematic, agency cost type of CPA after Citizens United. To that end, he shows that:  
 Firms that were politically active in 2008 experienced an average 8 percent lower 
 increase in their industry-relative shareholder value from their crisis-era lows when 
 compared to firms that were politically inactive in 2008, consistent with Citizens United 
 inducing an increase in unobservable political activity by previously politically active 
 firms, with a significant attendant drag on shareholder value. (Coates 2012, p. 688) 
  
In another study concerning corporate political spending as an agency problem, Aggarwal, 
Meschke, and Wang (2012, p. 0) “find virtually no support for the hypothesis that donations 
represent an investment in political capital.” This study differs from most studies in the literature 
by examining corporate soft money donations and corporate donations to §527 organizations, both 
of which came directly from corporate treasuries. As can be seen in this review, most of the 
corporate political spending literature relies on firms’ PAC spending and/or the personal political 
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spending of executives. However, the Citizens United decision allows corporations to spend freely 
on politics from their own funds, so Aggarwal et al. (2012) choose to study the political spending 
that most closely resembles the spending which is now essentially unlimited after Citizens United. 
They find that firms’ political spending is associated with lower stock returns, and “this reduction 
in shareholder value far outstrips the dollar value of the donations” (Aggarwal et al. 2012, p. 1). 
Regarding the underlying mechanism for this value destruction, the study shows that firms that 
engage in these types of political spending have lower R&D and investment spending, despite 
having more free cash flow, and are more likely to acquire other firms. Importantly, the 
acquisitions made by these firms “have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement 
returns than non-donating firms,” suggesting that these acquisitions are questionable from a 
shareholder value perspective (Aggarwal et al. 2012, p. 0). Furthermore, higher levels of political 
spending are correlated with poorer corporate governance, but the difference in corporate 
governance does not fully explain the relationship between firms’ political spending and lower 
stock returns. That is, corporate political spending appears to have a negative effect on firms’ stock 
returns that is separate from the effect of the governance problems which may be facilitating the 
spending. (Aggarwal et al. 2012). 
Finally, Hadani and Schuler (2013) obtain results similar to the main findings of Coates 
(2012) but they do so in a broader sample of 943 firms from the S&P 1500 for which complete 
financial data were available for the years 1998-2008. Using a factor the authors call “corporate 
political investments,” developed from an exploratory factor analysis of firms’ lobbying expenses, 
PAC spending, soft money expenses, and donations to §527 groups, Hadani and Schuler (2013, p. 
165) show that firms’ corporate political investments in a given year “are negatively associated 
with market performance and cumulative political investments [sum of a firm’s corporate political 
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investments in prior years and the current year] worsen both market and accounting performance.” 
However, consistent with the findings in Coates (2012), these results do not hold for firms in 
regulated industries. In fact, cumulative corporate political investments are significantly positively 
associated with firm value for firms in regulated industries. The authors express surprise over their 
main findings, having predicted positive associations ex-ante, and conclude that agency theory 
provides the best explanation of their results (Hadani and Schuler 2013). 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
Clearly, the literature on the determinants of corporate political spending is conflicted. Probably 
the only conclusion that almost all researchers would agree upon is that corporate political 
spending may be beneficial, and thus likely strategic, for firms in regulated industries. Outside of 
that, it may be important to note some differences in these studies. Cooper et al. (2010) and Brown 
et al. (2015) both use measures of the number of candidates supported as their main proxies for 
corporate political spending, and they both find significant benefits to firms who support more 
candidates. None of the studies that find significant negative effects of corporate political spending 
consider how many candidates a firm supported. Additionally, Brown et al. (2015) and Akey 
(2015) both examine limited settings in which one may be more likely to see a positive effect of 
corporate political spending. Brown et al. (2015) only consider spending that supported candidates 
for the tax-writing committees of the U.S. Congress. Akey (2015) only examines political spending 
that supported candidates in competitive races where the margin of victory was less than 5%. In 
contrast, Coates (2012), Aggarwal et al. (2012), and Hadani and Schuler (2013) all examine 
relatively broad samples without many restrictions. Of note, the only major subsample analyses in 
Coates (2012) and Hadani and Schuler (2013) are those of firms in regulated industries, and both 
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studies find that the negative effects of corporate political spending do not hold for those firms. 
Thus, much of the apparent disagreement between these studies may be resolved with future 
research considering the measures used and settings examined.  
As to the debate over whether corporate political spending is a strategic investment or a 
wasteful agency problem, the evidence in aggregate would seem to indicate that it may be either 
depending on the situation. That is, some firms are clearly using political spending to their 
advantage (Cooper et al. 2010, Correia 2014, Akey 2015, Brown et al. 2015) while other firms are 
spending to their detriment (Aggarwal et al. 2012, Coates 2012, Hadani and Schuler 2013). 
However, an explanation that seems to be underappreciated in this literature, as I do not recall 
seeing it in much detail, is that some managers may be better than others at implementing corporate 
political spending as an investment and, perhaps, most managers are quite bad at it. This 
explanation could reconcile the differences mentioned above; good political spending managers 
may know to support a large number of candidates and to target candidates who are on particular 
committees or who are facing hotly-contested elections. Conversely, bad political spending 
managers may be more inclined to spend more freely but without a coherent plan, which could 
help to explain the generally negative relationships documented between amounts of political 
spending and firm value. This would be especially true if there were a correlation between being 
a bad political spending manager and poor managerial ability in general. As such, it may be proper 
to conclude that corporate political spending is motivated by either well-intentioned strategy or 
self-serving managerial discretion, but even well-intentioned strategy may not yield the desired 
benefits. 
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2.3 POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON INVESTING 
I will now discuss the existing literature as it pertains to political considerations in investor 
decision-making. While not directly addressing corporate political spending, a number of studies 
have shown that individual investors, fund managers, and analysts are influenced by their own 
politics and/or by the politics of firms’ management in their investment considerations. Starting 
with individual investors, Kaustia and Torstila (2011, p. 98) show that at least in Finland, “left-
wing voters and politicians are less likely to invest in stocks.” Their results indicate that compared 
to a member of a moderate right party a member of a moderate left party is 17% to 20% less likely 
to participate in the stock market. This effect is seen consistently across four different data sets, 
one of which consists of members of parliament who share similarly high levels of income and 
education. Kaustia and Torstila (2011, p. 99) attribute this “stock market aversion” effect to the 
“generalized antipathy towards capital markets” that is often associated with left-wing politics. 
They specify that the results are consistent with a “value-expressive hypothesis” wherein a left-
wing individual applies his political values to his economic choices (p. 99). The authors note that 
this makes sense in the framework provided by Fama and French (2007, p. 668) where investors 
may have “tastes for assets as consumption goods” independent of the assets’ potential economic 
payoffs. Finally, the authors also rule out alternative explanations including, “wealth effects, risk 
aversion, reverse causality, return expectations, safety net expectations, social capital, or trust” 
(Kaustia and Torstila 2011, p. 110). 
Another study involving individual investors was performed by Bonaparte and Kumar 
(2013). The study finds that political activism in general is linked to a higher likelihood of stock 
market participation. That is, “politically active individuals are 9-25% more likely to participate 
in the stock market” (Bonaparte and Kumar 2013, p. 760). Individuals are classified as politically 
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active if they are registered voters who report participating in most elections. The finding holds 
regardless of the individual’s personal politics, and the authors theorize that the effect is due to a 
lowered cost of information gathering. They note that politically active people spend more time 
following the news, roughly 30 minutes more per day, than those who are not politically active, 
and they infer that, “This interest in following political news has positive spillover effects on their 
efforts to gather stock market-related news, which increases their probability of participating in 
the stock market” (Bonaparte and Kumar 2013, p. 762). Furthermore, the study uses instrumental 
variables to test for the proposed causality and concludes that “greater political activism causes 
higher participation rates” (Bonaparte and Kumar 2013, p. 780). This relationship appears in 
multiple samples from the United States and also seems to hold in Europe when comparing 
country-level data. 
Perhaps most interesting and potentially concerning regarding individual investors’ 
consideration of politics is a study showing that investors are “more optimistic and perceive 
markets to be less risky and more undervalued when their preferred party is in power” (Bonaparte, 
Kumar, and Page 2017, p. 69). Drawing on two national surveys and brokerage data from a large 
discount broker in the US, the authors first demonstrate that investors’ attitudes toward the 
economy shift when there is a change in the party in power. Specifically, investors “become more 
optimistic about the stock market and the overall economy” when their party comes to power and 
become less optimistic when the party they oppose comes to power (p. 71). The decline in 
optimism is stronger for Democrats when Republicans come to power, but the authors note that 
this could be an artifact of asymmetry in their sample because it covers the later years of the Clinton 
administration, during which Republicans controlled Congress, and the George W. Bush 
administration when Republicans controlled both the White House and Congress (Bonaparte et al. 
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2017). The authors go on to show that investors also make real changes to their investments when 
a different party comes to power. During periods wherein their preferred party is in control, 
investors increase their exposures to systematic risk by investing more of their wealth in stocks, 
bonds, and mutual funds. Additionally, investors whose party is in power shift their portfolios to 
include more stocks with higher volatility as measured by market beta (Bonaparte et al. 2017). 
This shift toward higher risk investments does earn investors whose party is in power higher raw 
returns and higher market-adjusted returns. However, the study finds that, “the improvement in 
risk-adjusted performance is economically small” (Bonaparte et al. 2017, p. 92). 
Individual investors’ politics thus play a role in whether and how they invest. However, 
the effects of political considerations on investment are not limited to non-professionals. Chin and 
Parwada (2009) find that institutional fund managers are also swayed by their political preferences. 
Comparing the portfolios of money managers who gave contributions primarily to Democrats 
versus those who gave primarily to Republicans in the lead-up to the 2000 US Presidential election, 
the authors find that fund managers favor stocks that are perceived to have better prospects if their 
chosen candidate wins the election. That is, Democrat fund managers overweighted the stocks of 
companies widely perceived to benefit under a Gore presidency, and Republican fund managers 
overweighted the stocks of companies widely perceived to benefit under a Bush presidency (Chin 
and Parwada 2009). Interestingly, “politically-motivated trades perform significantly better than 
non-politically driven trades” (p. 6) during the period studied, and “post sell returns are positive, 
indicating both successful profit taking and forgone value from selling too early” (Chin and 
Parwada 2009, p. 29). This means that overweighting due to political preferences was actually 
beneficial for both Democrat and Republican money managers during the run-up to the 2000 
election. Framing their study as examining “whether real world investors take into account the 
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stock market effects of Presidential Election cycles,” Chin and Parwada argue that the 
overweighting was strategic and provide some evidence that money managers adjusted their 
portfolios across quarters in tune to new information about their preferred candidate’s chances of 
winning (2009, p. 28). However, the authors do not explicitly address why these Democrat and 
Republican money managers only exploited the politically-motivated trades affiliated with their 
preferred candidates. If the overweighting were purely strategic, money managers either failed to 
realize that politically-motivated trades would outperform on both sides or they were averse to 
investing in stocks perceived to do well under the candidate they opposed. 
In another study of fund managers, Democrat fund managers are found to underweight 
companies in the “politically sensitive industries” of tobacco, guns and defense, and natural 
resources, as well as companies with low scores on a measure of corporate social responsibility 
(Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, p. 3). Although Democrat managers are also more likely to run 
socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, the authors exclude SRI funds from their analyses, so 
their results reflect a tendency by Democrat fund managers to underweight “socially irresponsible” 
stocks despite not having any mandate to do so (Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, p. 18). The study 
does not make a strong assertion as to why Democrat fund managers avoid these stocks, but it does 
note that there is a negligible difference in fund performance between Democrat and Republican 
managers. Also, the underweighting by Democrat managers is not only in mutual funds but is also 
seen in a sample of hedge funds where managers are more likely to have a substantial portion of 
their own wealth invested in their funds and receive performance-based fees. The implication is 
that, at the least, Democrat managers do not appear to be sacrificing returns to avoid the “socially 
irresponsible” stocks (Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, p. 3). Overall, the magnitude of the 
underweighting of these stocks by Democrat managers in non-SRI funds is greater than half of the 
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underweighting seen in SRI funds. The authors suggest this could result in price effects, contrary 
to popular belief: “Considering that many professional managers are already practicing ‘closet 
SRI,’ it is unlikely that they will provide the contrarian positions needed to stabilize prices in 
markets” (Hong and Kostovetsky 2012, p. 19). 
Chin and Parwada (2009) and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) both show that professional 
investment managers exhibit preferences for or against certain kinds of firms depending on their 
personal political preferences. More recent literature suggests that investment managers and 
analysts also exhibit preferences for and against firms based on the politics of the firms’ managers. 
That is, investment professionals’ judgments about firms are influenced by the match or mismatch 
between their own political preferences and the political preferences of the firms’ management 
(Jannati, Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Wolfers 2016; Wintoki and Xi 2017). Wintoki and Xi 
(2017, p. 0) find that, “mutual fund managers are more likely to allocate assets to firms managed 
by executives and directors with whom they share a similar political partisan affiliation.” This 
result still holds when controlling for the underweighting by Democrat fund managers of 
politically sensitive industries identified in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012). Wintoki and Xi (2017) 
attribute the effect to in-group favoritism by ruling out two alternative explanations. First, prior 
literature has shown that information can flow to investment professionals through their social ties 
with firms’ directors (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki 2016). 
However, if this were the reason that fund managers overweight the stocks of companies run by 
their politically-affiliated peers, the fund managers should benefit from the information flow and 
experience higher returns as a result. On the contrary, Wintoki and Xi (2017, p. 5) find that fund 
managers who allocate more of their portfolios to these “politically similar firms” underperform 
fund managers who do not. Second, the authors speculate that their effect could be due to the 
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“familiarity” of fund managers with executives who share their political beliefs (p. 3). Essentially, 
they could simply be investing more in the firms managed by people whom they know. Wintoki 
and Xi (2017) leverage the finding from Bonaparte et al. (2017) to rule out this explanation. If the 
overallocation effect were due to familiarity with executives rather than in-group favoritism based 
on political affiliation, Wintoki and Xi (2017) argue that the effect should not vary when political 
power changes hands because the familiarity that has already been established would not change. 
Nonetheless, they find that mutual fund managers were more likely to over-allocate to the firms of 
politically similar executives when their party held the presidency. This holds true for both 
Democrat and Republican fund managers. Thus, Wintoki and Xi (2017) conclude that it is likely 
that the overallocation effect is due to in-group favoritism wherein fund managers perceive 
executives who share their political preferences to be of higher ability than others. They also note 
that this “partisan bias” is similar in effect size to other known investor biases, including the home 
state bias shown in Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012) (Wintoki and Xi 2017, p. 6). 
While Wintoki and Xi (2017) document political in-group favoritism in fund managers, 
Jannati et al. (2016) document a very similar effect in equity analysts. They find that analysts have 
in-group biases “based on gender, ethnicity, and political attitudes” (Jannati et al. 2016, p. 0). Male 
analysts expect lower earnings from companies with female CEOs, and domestic analysts expect 
lower earnings from companies with foreign CEOs. Most pertinent to the present discussion 
though, “earnings forecasts of Republican analysts are lower for firms headed by Democrat CEOs” 
(Jannati et al. 2016, p. 0). Because most equity analysts are male, domestic, and Republican, these 
in-group biases have a systematic effect on consensus earnings forecasts and lead to significantly 
larger positive earnings surprises for firms with female or foreign CEOs and significantly smaller 
negative earnings surprises for firms with female, foreign, or Democrat CEOs. Firms with 
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Democrat CEOs also appear to have larger positive earnings surprises, but that effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly, analysts, overall, give significantly fewer 
buy recommendations and significantly more sell recommendations for firms with female CEOs 
or foreign CEOs. This pattern in stock recommendations is directionally the same for Republican 
analysts evaluating firms with Democrat CEOs, but it is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Nonetheless, the results for Republican analysts regarding firms of Democrat CEOs in 
Jannati et al. (2016) are consistent with the in-group favoritism effect seen in fund managers in 
Wintoki and Xi (2017). 
 Taken together, the literature regarding political considerations in investor decision-
making tells us that individuals’ political preferences influence whether and how they invest. 
Studies have shown that individual investors are less likely to invest in stocks if they vote for left-
wing political parties (Kaustia and Torstila 2011), more likely to invest in stocks if they vote 
regularly (Bonaparte and Kumar 2013), and likely to invest more in financial assets and shift to 
riskier stocks when their preferred political party is in power (Bonaparte et al. 2017). Professional 
investors are also influenced by their political preferences. Fund managers invest more in 
companies perceived to do well if their preferred Presidential candidate wins an election (Chin and 
Parwada 2009). Democrat fund managers shy away from companies in politically sensitive 
industries and companies that have low corporate social responsibility ratings (Hong and 
Kostovetsky 2012). Fund managers invest more in firms whose executives and directors are 
politically aligned with them (Wintoki and Xi 2017). Republican equity analysts give lower 
earnings estimates to firms led by Democrat CEOs (Jannati et al. 2016). The reasons behind these 
effects are not yet entirely clear, but suggested reasons include the expression of personal values 
(Kaustia and Torstila 2011), optimism tied to political outcomes (Chin and Parwada 2009, 
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Bonaparte et al. 2017), and in-group bias (Jannati et al. 2016, Wintoki and Xi 2017). My study 
adds to this literature by identifying another situation in which political considerations influence 
investor decision-making and by attempting to shed additional light on the reasons behind that 
influence. 
2.4 DISCLOSURE AND POLITICAL SPENDING 
2.4.1 Theory Regarding Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure 
It is not clear how financial statement users may respond to a disclosure differently whether it is 
mandatory versus voluntary. There is a substantial literature about disclosure in economics and 
accounting (Beyer et al. 2010). Yet, few studies pertain to differences in investors’ responses to 
information that is disclosed by mandate or by choice. We know that firms generally have 
incentives to disclose their privately-held information (Akerlof 1970) and that many models 
predict the “unraveling result” in which firms voluntarily disclose all their private information 
(Grossman and Hart 1980, Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981, Milgrom and Roberts 1986). However, 
these models rely on simplifying assumptions that are not always valid in practice. Two in 
particular seem unlikely to hold with respect to corporate political spending information. First, the 
disclosure models predicting the unraveling result presume that, “all investors interpret the firms’ 
disclosure in the same way and firms know how investors will interpret that disclosure” (Beyer et 
al. 2010, p. 300-301). Politics being as divisive as they are, it is hard to fathom that almost any 
disclosure of corporate political spending would be interpreted identically across all investors and 
even less plausible that firms would be able to anticipate investors’ interpretation with certainty. 
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Second, the disclosure models predicting the unraveling result presume that, “disclosures are 
costless” (Beyer et al. 2010, p. 300). Although the actions necessary to disclose corporate political 
spending information are inexpensive, the disclosure itself may cause a firm to incur costs as has 
been seen in politically-motivated customer boycotts of Target and L.L. Bean (Montopoli 2010, 
Victor 2017). 
Violating the assumption about uniformity of investors’ interpretations lead to different 
predictions about firms’ disclosure policy. If managers believe that investors have their own 
private information, managers could have difficulty predicting what investors’ responses to 
disclosure will be (Beyer et al. 2010). Dutta and Trueman (2002) create a model in which investors 
have private information that affects how they will interpret management’s disclosure. Managers 
must rely on their beliefs about what investors’ interpretations of the disclosure will be, and thus 
the unraveling result no longer holds. This could map to the corporate political spending setting in 
which all investors presumably hold private information about their own political preferences. As 
such, managers would need to assess investors’ politics in deciding what to disclose about their 
firm’s political spending, and this could explain why we do not see the unraveling result in practice 
with regard to the disclosure of corporate political spending. 
Similarly, violating the assumption that disclosure is costless can also lead to managers 
being selective about their disclosures (Verrecchia 1983, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). This 
may partly explain why we do not see the unraveling result in the disclosure of corporate political 
spending. As mentioned before, there is anecdotal evidence that political spending associated with 
a firm can trigger customer boycotts (Montopoli 2010, Victor 2017), and as mentioned directly 
above, it is also unlikely that investors would respond to corporate political spending information 
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uniformly. It seems plausible that managers consider these potential costs when deciding what to 
disclose about their firms’ political spending.   
As Koonce, Seybert, and Smith (2011) point out, there is good reason to believe that 
investors may interpret disclosures differently depending on whether they are mandatory or 
voluntary. Correspondent inference theory specifies that, “individuals typically rely on three 
factors–choice, expectations, and intent,” in deciding how to attribute the cause of a single outcome 
(Koonce et al. 2011, p. 213). The choice component could matter in how investors interpret 
disclosures because “behavior that is freely chosen is generally attributed to the person more than 
if that same behavior was coerced” (Koonce et al. 2011, p. 213). This means that investors might 
attribute the content of a voluntary disclosure to company managers more than if it were part of a 
mandatory disclosure. That is, a voluntary disclosure may be interpreted as expressing information 
about management’s preferences or beliefs, whereas a mandatory disclosure is less likely to be 
interpreted that way. 
This potential difference in interpretation is also predicted by signaling theory in 
economics. Spence (1973) introduces the idea that an individual may choose to undertake a costly 
action just to signal his value to a potential employer. In the Spence setting, the costly action is 
acquiring an education, but the notion could generalize to other settings. Bhattacharya & Ritter 
(1983) expand on the signaling model to show that firms may be willing to voluntarily disclose 
private information even when doing so is costly to their competitive position in order to secure 
financing from investors. What follows naturally from these models is that costly disclosure 
choices convey information beyond the information contained in the disclosure. In Spence (1973), 
the choice to obtain an education does not just convey that the individual now has an education 
but that the individual was more capable of getting one relative to his competitors. In Bhattacharya 
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and Ritter (1983), the choice to disclose R&D information does not just convey that the company 
has that technological know-how but that management believes the company can follow through 
on developing it to a point that will justify having disclosed the information publicly, enabling 
competitors, to obtain financing. Essentially, the disclosure choice is information about the 
discloser in addition to whatever information is contained in the voluntary disclosure. Contrasting 
this with a mandatory disclosure where the discloser must reveal a particular set of information, a 
voluntary disclosure by its nature can convey information about the discloser that cannot be 
inferred from a mandatory disclosure. 
2.4.2 Empirical Work on Corporate Political Spending Disclosure  
I now discuss the literature as it pertains directly to the disclosure of corporate political spending. 
This literature is relatively nascent because prior to the Citizens United ruling in 2010 corporations 
in the US were generally prohibited from using their own funds for political purposes and, to my 
knowledge, all corporate political spending that did occur prior to Citizens United, either with 
corporate funds or with executive/employee funds, was subject to FEC and/or IRS reporting 
requirements. As such, U.S. corporations have only had the legal capacity to spend anonymously 
on political activity for about seven years. I exclude law review articles and other legal or political 
essays from this section as I am most interested in relating what has been discovered empirically 
about corporate political spending disclosure. 
Baloria, Klassen, and Wiedman (2015) examine the disclosure of corporate political 
spending in the broader context of shareholder proposals for voluntary disclosures. They note that, 
“there are virtually no firms initiating disclosure of political spending in the absence of a 
shareholder proposal” (Baloria et al. 2015, p. 2). Using “a sample of 541 proposals submitted to 
 32 
S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2012,” the authors find that about 20% of proposals get 
implemented, but that most proposals that get implemented have been withdrawn prior to vote 
(Baloria et al. 2015, p. 2). That is, among proposals that go up for a shareholder vote, only 8% are 
implemented, while 56% of proposals that have been withdrawn are subsequently implemented. 
The authors provide evidence suggesting that withdrawn proposals are the results of negotiations 
with firms’ management. Furthermore, the study shows that activist investors may have different 
reasons for seeking disclosure. Pension funds are significantly more likely to submit disclosure 
proposals to firms that have a higher proportion of their PAC spending directed to Republicans, 
and pension funds do not appear to specifically target firms with signs of agency problems. All 
other activist investors are significantly more likely to target firms with signs of agency problems, 
but they do not appear to consider the firms’ political ideologies. Interestingly, the authors provide 
evidence that both firms’ management and investors are aware of these different motivations. 
Proposals brought by pension funds are less likely to be withdrawn before a vote, and thus they 
are also less likely to be implemented. This implies that firms’ management are less likely to 
negotiate with pension fund activists compared to other activists. Moreover, “investors respond 
negatively, on average, to firms announcing the implementation of political spending-related 
proposals. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that investor reaction is positively related to the 
extent of firms’ agency problems and negatively related to the existence of a pension fund proposal 
sponsor” (Baloria et al. 2015, p. 4). So, shareholder activism is at least somewhat effective in 
bringing about voluntary disclosure of corporate political spending, especially at the firms that 
may be suffering from agency problems. Also, investors’ reactions suggest that they pay attention 
to why the voluntary disclosure has been initiated and respond accordingly. 
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In another study, DeBoskey, Li, Lobo, and Luo (2017) examine the transparency of firms’ 
corporate political disclosure (CPD) and their effect on firms’ cost of debt. They use the CPA-
Zicklin index, a measure of firms’ disclosure transparency about their “overall political activities, 
including spending, policies, and oversight” (DeBoskey et al. 2017, p. 4). The authors find that 
more transparent disclosure about firms’ political activities, including political spending, is 
associated with lower costs of debt. The effect is “more pronounced for firms that are more 
sensitive to government economic policy, have entrenched CEOs, and are smaller” (DeBoskey et 
al. 2017, p. 5). The relationship remains significant even when controlling for measures of 
financial reporting quality and other non-financial disclosure quality. According to the authors, 
“This suggests that CPD represents a distinct dimension of a firm’s non-financial disclosure that 
reduces creditors’ political risk uncertainty” (DeBoskey et al. 2017, p. 6). They also suggest that 
their findings could be because more transparent CPD leads to reduced agency costs by increasing 
accountability for corporate political spending. (DeBoskey et al. 2017) 
Finally, Prabhat and Primo (2017) examine the mandatory disclosure of corporate political 
spending that has been law in the United Kingdom since 2000. The Political Parties, Elections, 
and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) requires disclosure of corporate political spending and also 
requires shareholder approval before spending occurs. The authors find that politically active firms 
now have greater stock return volatility than before the mandate, and they find that while politically 
active firms did not immediately lose value after the announcement of the new policy, they have 
lost value in the ensuing years. Prabhat and Primo (2017) interpret their findings as an indictment 
of the idea that mandatory disclosure of corporate political spending is beneficial to shareholders. 
In discussing the US proponents of such a law, they note that these activists focus too much on the 
potential agency costs of corporate political spending and fail to recognize that “the preferences of 
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some shareholders may not be aligned with the goal of maximizing shareholder value” (Prabhat 
and Primo 2017, p. 20). They suggest that the law in the UK may have changed managers’ behavior 
regarding useful political spending and as such “the firm may be less adept at responding to 
political threats” (Prabhat and Primo 2017, p. 21). 
Synthesizing a coherent narrative from these studies may at first seem difficult, but at least 
two findings seem consistent here. First, some activist investors are seeking disclosure for political 
reasons. Baloria et al. (2015) find that pension funds target Republican-leaning firms, and Prabhat 
and Primo (2017) suggests that politically-driven activists may be scaring managers in the UK 
away from beneficial political spending. Second, both Baloria et al. (2015) and Prabhat and Primo 
(2017) find some evidence that equity markets generally respond negatively to the disclosure of 
corporate political spending. This finding would seem to align well with the studies supporting 
benefits of corporate political spending, presuming that disclosure discourages such spending. 
However, the finding in DeBoskey et al. (2017) is curious in this context, suggesting that creditors 
appreciate increased political spending disclosure while the other studies suggest that investors do 
not. Further research in this area could disentangle the factors underlying these effects. One 
possibility that comes to mind is that creditors are much more sensitive to the potential agency 
costs of corporate political spending, which could increase credit risk, and much less sensitive to 
the potential benefits of corporate political spending, which can increase returns for investors but 
are unlikely to affect returns for creditors. 
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3.0  STUDY OF HOW INVESTORS REACT TO CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPENDING DISCLOSURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Do investors care about the political spending of the firms in which they invest? This is the primary 
question behind the ongoing debate regarding whether public companies should be required to 
disclose their political spending. In its Citizens United decision in 2010, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that corporations and unions could spend unlimited amounts on political advertising. 
Although this allows corporations to openly sponsor political advertising, it also allows 
corporations to instead fund certain §501(c) groups that then sponsor political advertising with no 
requirement to disclose the original funding source (Palmer and Phillip 2012). These groups are 
often referred to as “dark money” groups because they allow corporations to influence political 
outcomes without their shareholders or the public knowing how much they are spending in support 
of particular candidates or causes.1  
As a result, some argue that the SEC should require corporations to disclose their political 
spending as a matter of investor protection, arguing that investors should be informed of 
corporations’ political activity (Bebchuk and Jackson 2013). However, others argue that investors 
“will likely not find this additional information useful,” partly because the amount of political 
spending by any individual firm is unlikely to be financially material (Bainbridge et al. 2012, p. 
                                                 
1 The specific §501(c) groups that can be used for this purpose are defined by the Internal Revenue Code and 
include §501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, §501(c)(5) Labor and Agricultural Organizations, and §501(c)(6) 
Business Leagues. Further information on why these groups are referred to as “dark money” can be found at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php. 
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1). Thus, the main purpose of my study is to provide empirical evidence for regulators on whether 
investors find corporate political spending information useful and use it in their investment 
decisions.   
I conduct an experiment to examine whether and how investors use financially immaterial 
disclosed corporate political spending information when making investment decisions and whether 
it matters if the disclosure is mandatory rather than voluntary as it is currently. Further, I examine 
whether investors’ use of disclosed political spending information depends upon their beliefs 
regarding the effect of the disclosed spending on the firm’s financial performance. I predict and 
find that investors whose personal political identities are aligned with a company’s disclosed 
political spending assess the company as more attractive as an investment and invest more in the 
company than investors whose political identities are misaligned with the political spending. 
Interestingly, this finding is primarily driven by the negative reactions of misaligned investors. 
Misaligned investors assess the company as significantly less attractive as an investment and invest 
significantly less in the company than investors in a control condition with no political spending 
disclosure. However, aligned investors’ attractiveness assessments and investment amounts are 
not significantly different from those in the control condition. This suggests that any disclosure of 
corporate political spending may lead to a negative overall effect on investment in a company and 
may explain why business groups have opposed disclosure.         
I also provide evidence that investors use disclosed political spending information 
consciously rather than because of a subconscious bias and that some investors use the information 
in their investment decisions even though they do not believe the disclosure will affect the firm’s 
financial performance while others use it because they expect financial implications. That is, some 
investors appear to simply have investing tastes (Fama and French 2007) directed against political 
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spending that conflicts with their personal political identities, while other investors appear to 
believe that political spending that conflicts with their personal political identities portends poorer 
financial performance. Finally, I find no significant effects of mandatory versus voluntary 
disclosure, suggesting that mandating disclosure of corporate political spending would not change 
how investors use it. 
My findings provide evidence for regulators regarding whether to require corporations to 
disclose their political spending. The finding that investors consciously use disclosed corporate 
political spending information when making investment decisions indicates that they consider such 
information useful. The finding that some investors use the information without even considering 
whether there could be financial implications suggests that such investment decisions are based on 
taste rather than any potential financial effects and that financially immaterial political spending 
can still affect investors’ choices. Combining these findings with the additional finding that 
investors use the information in the same way regardless of whether the firm provides it voluntarily 
or in a required disclosure suggests that investors could benefit from mandatory disclosure of 
corporate political spending. 
My study also extends the finance literature on the effect of “tastes” for assets on 
investment decisions (Fama and French 2007). Although prior studies show that individual 
investors become more optimistic when their preferred party is in power (Bonaparte et al. 2017) 
and money managers invest in specific industries or types of companies based on their political 
preferences (Chin and Parwada 2009, Hong and Kostovetsky 2012), my study is the first to 
document that the nature of the disclosed political spending of an individual firm can affect how 
investors view that firm as an investment. Furthermore, I provide evidence that investors use 
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political spending information in different ways, with some investors forming expectations of 
financial implications for the firm and other investors making decisions simply by their tastes.     
Finally, my study extends prior results showing that investment decisions are more affected 
by negative political considerations than by positive political considerations. Consistent with Hong 
and Kostovetsky, who find that Democrat money managers make less investment in “socially 
irresponsible” firms, and with Kaustia and Torstila (2011), who find that left-wing voters and 
politicians in Finland are less likely to participate in the stock market based on their negative views 
of capitalism, I find that investors whose political identities are misaligned with the political 
spending of a company assess that company as a less attractive investment and invest less in the 
company. Further, I find that this negative reaction to political spending that conflicts with their 
personal political identities holds not only for investors with progressive political identities, as 
seen in prior studies, but also for investors with conservative political identities. 
The next section provides background on corporate political spending and its disclosure. 
Section III develops my hypotheses and research question, and Section IV describes my research 
method. Section V presents my results, and Section VI concludes the paper with a discussion of 
the implications of my findings. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
In the majority opinion of the Citizens United case, Justice Kennedy wrote, “With the advent of 
the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and 
supporters.” This suggests that the majority of the Supreme Court anticipated that corporations 
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would disclose information about their newly allowed political spending. However, such 
disclosure has not been forthcoming from most companies (Blumenthal 2015).  
Although companies may now sponsor political advertising directly and publicly, most 
choose to spend on elections using either independent expenditure-only committees, better known 
as Super PACs, or using certain not-for-profit groups falling under §501(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. In either case, the companies themselves are not required to disclose their political spending. 
However, funds given to Super PACs are ultimately disclosed by the Super PAC pursuant to 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations.2 For example, in 2010, Target gave $150,000 to 
a conservative Super PAC in Minnesota supporting an anti-gay marriage gubernatorial candidate 
and then faced a boycott by gay rights activists after its contribution was disclosed by the Super 
PAC (Torres-Spelliscy 2010). 
In contrast to Super PACs, the dark money §501(c) groups are not subject to the same FEC 
regulations and thus are not required to publicly disclose their donors if political action is not their 
“primary activity.”3 In the 2012 election cycle, spending by these dark money groups and by 
groups that received considerable support from dark money groups exceeded $300 million and 
accounted for almost 30% of outside spending (Center for Responsive Politics 2016b).4 Using 
such dark money groups corporations can influence political outcomes without their shareholders 
or the public knowing how much they are spending to support particular candidates or causes. 
                                                 
2 Super PACs must disclose their donors, so all money flowing into a Super PAC can be traced at least one level 
back. However, §501(c) groups may contribute to Super PACs without disclosing their donors. In such a case, the 
§501(c) group would be disclosed as a donor by the Super PAC, but the original source of the contributed funds 
would remain unknown to the public.   
3 An explanation of the IRS’s policies on §501(c)(4), §501(c)(5), and §501(c)(6) organizations regarding political 
activity can be found at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf. 
4 Outside spending includes “political expenditures made by groups or individuals independently of, and not 
coordinated with, candidates' committees” (Center for Responsive Politics 2016a). 
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In response to the concern about dark money, a petition to the SEC in 2011 by a committee 
of ten prominent legal scholars proposed that the agency should require disclosure of corporate 
political spending, arguing that investors should be aware of corporations’ political activity 
(Bebchuk and Jackson 2013). The petition has drawn the most comment letters in the history of 
the SEC with over 1.2 million, “an overwhelming majority” of which support the petition 
(Bebchuk and Jackson 2015).5 The petition is also supported by many prominent individuals, 
including former SEC chairmen William Donaldson and Arthur Levitt.6  
Conversely, others argue that requiring disclosure of political spending falls outside the 
SEC’s mission and is unnecessary for investor protection. In a comment letter on the petition to 
the SEC, a group of scholars led by Stephen Bainbridge of UCLA offers several arguments 
opposing the creation of a rule mandating disclosure. Among other things, these scholars contend 
that investors “will likely not find this additional information useful,” noting that political spending 
amounts are unlikely to be financially material for most companies (Bainbridge et al. 2012, p. 1).7 
To date, the SEC has not passed any rules requiring disclosure of corporate political 
spending. After former SEC chairwoman Mary Jo White was pressured by House Republicans to 
dismiss the petition requesting mandatory disclosure of corporate political spending, the SEC 
removed the issue from its agenda in late 2013 (ElBoghdady 2013a, ElBoghdady 2013b). 
Furthermore, the federal budget for 2016 contained a provision precluding the SEC from issuing 
                                                 
5 All the comment letters are available at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4-637.shtml 
6 Their comment letter can be seen at: https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-3105.pdf 
7 Bainbridge et al. (2012) also raise other objections to the proposed disclosure rule. These include assertions that 
corporate political spending is already disclosed in other ways, that a rule mandating disclosure would “burden 
political expression,” and that making such a rule would destroy the SEC’s nonpartisan integrity. Bebchuk and 
Jackson (2013) respond to many of these objections and argue that they are invalid based on matters of 
institutional or legal fact.  
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any rule during 2016 that would require the disclosure of corporate political spending (Bebchuk 
and Jackson 2015). 
Therefore, disclosure of corporate political spending currently remains voluntary. Baloria 
et al. (2015) document a number of cases wherein shareholder proposals have led companies to 
disclose their political spending. Some other companies may elect to disclose the information 
without such prompting. In either case, it is difficult to determine how complete these disclosures 
are.8 Given that disclosure is not required in the United States, there are no reliable archival data 
available domestically to examine how investors react to mandatory versus voluntary disclosure 
of corporate political spending. The UK does have a law mandating disclosure of corporate 
political spending, and there is evidence that investors reacted negatively to the passage of that 
law (Prabhat and Primo 2017). However, I have not seen any studies specifically examining 
investor reaction with UK firms that previously disclosed voluntarily, so it is hard to say if 
mandatory disclosure changed how investors reacted to corporate political spending. Certainly, the 
implication in Prabhat and Primo (2017) is simply that investors found politically active firms to 
be less valuable once they had to disclose their spending, which could be due to an assumption 
that the firms will no longer be able to curry political favor as well as they did prior.     So, prior 
to issuing any rule on the disclosure of corporate political spending, it would be helpful for the 
SEC and other standard setters to better understand whether investors find such disclosures useful.   
                                                 
8 Some information about individual companies’ spending on dark money groups may be found at 
http://politicalaccountability.net/what-does-your-company-spend. However, many companies’ disclosures are 
limited to policies regarding such spending and/or the portion of such spending that is specifically allocated to 
lobbying expenses and is therefore non-deductible for tax purposes. As such, the full amounts spent on dark 
money groups are rarely disclosed. 
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3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
I rely on prior findings in the finance literature to predict how the disclosure of corporate political 
spending is likely to affect investor behavior. First, prior theoretical research suggests that 
investors’ decisions do not necessarily depend only on their prospective payoffs and the associated 
risks. Rather, some investors appear to exhibit “tastes” for assets as though they were consumption 
goods, and these tastes can create lasting price effects in equity markets (Fama & French 2007). 
Second, some evidence suggests that investors could have tastes based on their political identities. 
Kaustia and Torstila (2011) provide evidence that left-wing voters and politicians in Finland are 
less likely than others to participate in the stock market. They interpret this as “value-expressive” 
behavior, in which left-leaning individuals have more negative views of the capitalist system and 
thus choose not to invest in stocks.  
Similarly, Chin and Parwada (2009) and Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that fund 
managers make investment decisions based on their party affiliations. Chin and Parwada (2009) 
use fund holdings data during the U.S. presidential election in 2000 to show that fund managers 
traded stocks in accordance with their party affiliations. That is, fund managers who were 
Republican (Democrat) overweighted the stocks of companies that were expected to perform better 
under a Bush (Gore) presidency. Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) find that fund managers who make 
more contributions to the political campaigns of Democrats than those of Republicans invest 
smaller portions of their funds in firms within industries like tobacco and gun-making that are 
likely viewed as socially irresponsible by Democrats. Additionally, these Democrat-supporting 
managers tend to avoid investing in firms with low scores on corporate social responsibility. 
Alternatively, rather than demonstrating investors’ political tastes, the findings described 
above could also result from investors holding different financial expectations because of their 
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politics. There is evidence that investors in the U.S. are more optimistic about financial markets 
when their favored party is in power (Bonaparte et al. 2017). Unlike the findings above that could 
be the result of political tastes, the effect seen in Bonaparte et al. is clearly not a taste for an asset 
but a difference in expected financial outcomes. Investors whose party is in power tend to have 
lower perceptions of risk and higher confidence in the financial markets and the economy. Such 
perceptions lead these investors to allocate higher amounts to risky assets during periods when 
their party is in power (Bonaparte et al. 2017). This suggests another reason in addition to political 
tastes for why investors’ political identities could influence their judgments. If a company’s 
management directs its corporate political spending in a manner with which investors agree, the 
investors may genuinely expect the company to have a better financial outcome. Because it is hard 
to tell in much of the existing literature whether tastes or financial expectations are responsible for 
the influence of politics on investor behavior, I designed my study to identify which of these 
reasons drives investors’ reactions to corporate political spending.     
My first hypothesis follows from the results described above showing that tastes and/or 
financial expectations related to political identities can cause investors to favor some investments 
over others. Specifically, if investors can have tastes that affect how they value firms (Fama and 
French 2007) and if those tastes are related to their political identities (Chin and Parwada 2009, 
Kaustia and Torstila 2011, Hong & Kostovetsky 2012), investors are likely to value firms 
differently depending on the type of political spending they disclose. Likewise, if investors form 
different financial expectations based on their political identities (Bonaparte et al. 2017), they also 
are likely to value firms differently depending on the type of political spending they disclose.  That 
is, an investor could value a firm more positively or negatively depending on whether its political 
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spending is aligned or misaligned with the investor’s personal political identity. Therefore, my 
first hypothesis is: 
H1: Investors will value firms that disclose political spending that is aligned with the 
investors’ political identities higher than firms that disclose political spending that is 
misaligned with their political identities. 
 
Additionally, I hypothesize that investors will consciously behave as predicted in H1. I 
base this hypothesis on two arguments. First, the existence of socially-responsible investment 
(SRI) funds indicates that some investors consciously select firms based on personal tastes. Such 
investors purposefully buy shares in firms whose business activities and practices are not in 
conflict with their personal values. Although these SRI funds are not specifically political in 
nature, some of the issues that determine how they invest, such as firms’ carbon emissions, are 
politically charged. Second, the petition to the SEC requesting it require the disclosure of corporate 
political spending information has been supported by some investors who express concern that 
corporate political spending could run counter to their personal views.9 This shows that at least 
some investors explicitly consider a company’s political spending when making investment 
decisions. 
Alternatively, investors may not be fully aware of their politically-derived tastes and/or 
financial expectations and could subconsciously value firms differently based on the firms’ 
disclosed political spending. Although this is possible, it appears unlikely given the recognition by 
some investors that firms could have political spending with which they disagree and would act 
against if given the opportunity. This leads to my second hypothesis:       
                                                 
9 As an example, in a comment letter dated May 6, 2015, “Brian Arbogast, et al.” state, “Shareholders cannot 
determine whether corporate political expenditures are supporting individuals or groups that engage in advocacy 
on other issues to which they object, and therefore cannot exercise their ownership rights by attempting to restrict 
such spending or by selling their stakes in the company.” https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-3020.pdf 
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H2: Investors will consciously value firms that disclose political spending that is 
aligned with the investors’ political identities higher than firms that disclose political 
spending that is misaligned with their political identities. 
 
The hypotheses above make general predictions that investors will use corporate political 
spending information when making investment decisions. However, they do not address whether 
investors might use such information differently if the disclosure is mandatory rather than 
voluntary. Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of corporate political spending information may 
not affect how investors use such information if investors find it equally salient in both cases. That 
is, if investors believe such information is relevant for their decisions, they would be expected to 
use it whether the company disclosed it voluntarily or because it was required to disclose it under 
reporting standards.  
Alternatively, mandatory disclosure could cause investors to view the political spending 
information as more important or less important, depending on their perceptions of required 
disclosures. Some investors could believe that any information that is required to be disclosed must 
be important or disclosure wouldn’t be required. For such investors, mandating disclosure could 
cause them to weight the information more heavily than they otherwise would. Conversely, some 
investors could believe required disclosures are provided simply to fulfill a requirement and 
therefore may not be very important.  For such investors, mandating disclosure may have little, if 
any, effect on their investment decisions. 
The potential influence of voluntary disclosure on investors’ use of corporate political 
spending information could be similarly complicated. Some investors could believe that any 
information that a company voluntarily discloses must be an important signal because the company 
is going beyond its legal duty in providing information. This would be consistent with theory 
related to signaling in the economic literature (Spencer 1973, Bhattacharya and Ritter 1983). This 
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would especially apply to political spending information because its divisive nature could subject 
the company to criticism and potential costs. Investors who believe voluntarily disclosed political 
spending is a signal would weigh it more heavily. However, investors could alternatively believe 
that a company disclosing political spending information voluntarily has such uncontroversial 
spending that it is not risking potential criticisms and costs. In that case, investors would not 
perceive the spending as a signal and would not weigh it more heavily.     
Because it is difficult to predict whether investors will use political spending information 
differently when provided voluntarily as compared to when it is a required disclosure, I test the 
following research question: 
RQ: How, if at all, does mandatory versus voluntary disclosure affect investors’ 
reactions to corporate political spending information? 
 
3.4 METHOD  
3.4.1 Participants  
Prior research has supported the recruitment of non-professional investors through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and has shown that these participants behave similarly to other non-
professional investors (Rennekamp 2012, Owens 2014, Krische 2015). As such, I recruited 162 
non-professional investor participants via mTurk, restricting participation to those located in the 
United States with an approval rating on previous tasks of at least 95%. Participants were paid 
$2.25 each and took an average of slightly less than 19 minutes to complete the study. 
To limit the incentive for participants to misidentify themselves as investors, I did not 
screen for this attribute prior to participation in the study. Instead, I included a question in the post-
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experimental questionnaire related to investing experience and identified non-professional 
investors by using their responses to this question. Of 331 participants who completed the study 
in accordance with the requirements, 162 (49%) report having invested in stocks. These 162 
participants are the non-professional investors (hereafter, referred to simply as investors) that I use 
in my analyses.10  
Of the 162 investor participants, 153 (94%) indicate they have read financial statements, 
144 (89%) report currently holding investments, and 91 (56.2%) report that their current 
investment holdings exceed $10,000. Further, participants’ average age is 38 years; 65% are male; 
59% hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher; and 99% report being U.S. citizens (all but two who are 
non-citizen residents), suggesting that they should be familiar with, and interested in, American 
politics.11 
3.4.2 Design  
I use a 1 x 3 experimental design to test H1 and H2. I collect both between-participants and within-
participant data for the three conditions. The three conditions are Aligned, Misaligned, and 
Control. In the Aligned condition, investors’ political identities are aligned with the company’s 
disclosed political spending. In the Misaligned condition, investors’ political identities are 
misaligned with the company’s disclosed political spending. In the Control condition, no political 
spending information is disclosed. To form the Aligned and Misaligned conditions, I manipulate 
                                                 
10 350 participants completed the study, but 19 of these participants were removed because they had re-entered 
the study after either answering the manipulation check question incorrectly or failing to answer it at all.  
11 Using pre-screens available on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I restricted the availability of my study to U.S. 
residents. I believe citizens and non-citizen residents are likely to be familiar with and interested in American 
politics. Regardless, if any of my participants lacks an interest in American politics, this should only serve to bias 
against finding support for my predictions.  
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the type of political spending by the company (Progressive versus Conservative) and measure the 
political identities of the investors (Progressive versus Conservative). Investors are included in the 
Aligned condition when their measured political identity is aligned with the manipulated disclosed 
political spending of the company; they are included in the Misaligned condition when their 
measured political identity is not aligned with the disclosed political spending of the company. 
Next, I describe the procedures related to the conditions used to test H1 and H2. This is followed 
by a separate section that describes the additional conditions and procedures used to test my RQ. 
3.4.3 Procedures related to H1 and H2 
I conduct my study using the Qualtrics survey platform. First, investors are randomized into one 
of three corporate political spending disclosure manipulations: progressive spending, conservative 
spending, or no spending disclosure.12 These manipulations allow me to form my 1 x 3 design with 
the Aligned, Misaligned, and Control conditions. A summary of these conditions is shown in Panel 
A of Table 1. 
                                                 
12 The progressive spending and conservative spending manipulations are also randomly treated with one of three 
disclosure manipulations. The Mandatory and Voluntary disclosure manipulations are achieved by adding an 
introductory clause to the disclosure explicitly stating that it is or is not required. The Unspecified disclosure 
manipulation does not have an introductory clause. 
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Table 1. Variable Names and Descriptions 
Panel A: Primary Independent Variable (Conditions) 
Name Description 
Aligned Investor’s political identity is aligned with company’s political spending 
Misaligned Investor’s political identity is not aligned with company’s political spending 
Control No disclosure of political spending 
 
 
Panel B: Primary Dependent Variables1,2 
Name Description 
Attractivenessbt Between-participant measure of the company’s attractiveness as an 
investment on a scale of 1 (Very Unattractive) to 11 (Very Attractive) 
Investmentbt Between-participant measure of how much of a $1,000 industry allocation, in 
$100 increments starting from $0, an investor would choose to invest in the 
company 
AttractivenessC Within-participant measure that is identical to Attractivenessbt, except that 
investors are told to assume the company had not disclosed any political 
spending 
InvestmentC Within-participant measure that is identical to Investmentbt, except that 
investors are told to assume the company had not disclosed any political 
spending 
Attractivenesswi Within-participant measure that is identical to Attractivenessbt, except that 
investors are told to assume political spending had been the opposite of what 
it was for Attractivenessbt3 
Investmentwi Within-participant measure that is identical to Investmentbt, except that 
investors are told to assume political spending had been the opposite of what 
it was for Investmentbt3 
 
1 Investors in the between-participant Control condition only respond to Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt. They do 
not complete the other measures. 
 
2 Investors respond to Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt, then AttractivenessC and InvestmentC, and finally 
Attractivenesswi and Investmentwi. 
 
3 Investors who initially saw the company spend on The Fund for a Progressive America (The Fund for a Conservative 
America) are told to respond to Attractivenesswi and Investmentwi assuming that the company had instead spent on 
The Fund for a Conservative America (The Fund for a Progressive America). 
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Investors read a description of the company, Great Grocer, which includes information 
about its business strategy and financial performance, along with an income statement for the most 
recent year, and a disclosure of political spending information if applicable (see Appendix A for 
an example). Investors then provide responses for my primary, between-participant (designated by 
the bt subscript) dependent variables: Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt. For Attractivenessbt, 
investors indicate their “assessment of the attractiveness of Great Grocer as an investment” on an 
11-point scale with endpoints of “Very Unattractive”(1) and “Very Attractive”(11), and a midpoint 
of “Neither Attractive nor Unattractive.” For Investmentbt, investors are given some assumptions 
about their hypothetical portfolio and the company’s valuation and are then asked to indicate “how 
much of your $1,000 investment in this industry you would choose to invest in Great Grocer” on 
a scale from $0 to $1,000 in $100 increments. Panel B of Table 1 describes these variables and the 
other primary dependent variables in this study. 
Investors who saw either type of political spending disclosures in the between-participants 
conditions (that is, those not in the between-participants Control condition) next move to the 
within-participant portion of the study by reading the following statement: “Thank you for your 
previous responses. Now, please respond to the following two questions assuming that Great 
Grocer had not disclosed any political spending.” Investors then respond to the same two items 
they did earlier, giving a 1 to 11 assessment of attractiveness and a $0 to $1,000 choice for 
investment. These measures provide the within-participants control condition data, so I refer to 
them as Attractivenessc and Investmentc. Next, investors respond to the same two items one final 
time after being told to assume that Great Grocer disclosed political spending of the other type that 
they had not seen initially. Specifically, investors who initially saw the company spend on The 
Fund for a Progressive America (The Fund for a Conservative America) were now told to respond 
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assuming that the company instead had political spending to The Fund for a Conservative America 
(The Fund for a Progressive America). I refer to these measures as Attractivenesswi and 
Investmentwi13 Investors then answer questions regarding their perceptions of the effect of the 
firm’s political spending on its future financial performance and on other investors’ reactions. 
To identify investors’ political identities, which was necessary to classify them into the 
Aligned or Misaligned conditions, participants responded to the question, “If you decided to 
contribute to one of the two organizations mentioned in this study, which one would it be?” 
Investors chose between the Fund for a Progressive America and the Fund for a Conservative 
America. As explained earlier, the response to this question determines an investor’s political 
identity as progressive or conservative which is then compared to the political spending they saw 
earlier (progressive or conservative) to classify them as Aligned or Misaligned with the types of 
spending they saw earlier.       
Finally, all investors, including those in the between-participant Control condition, 
complete a post-experimental questionnaire answering questions regarding their impressions of 
corporate political spending, their political beliefs, and their demographic characteristics. 
3.4.4 Additional conditions and procedures related to my RQ 
To test my RQ, in addition to my primary conditions of Aligned, Misaligned, and Control, I also 
manipulate how political spending information is disclosed. Specifically, I vary a brief clause at 
                                                 
13 Attractivenesswi and Investmentwi are the measures for the within-participant Misaligned (Aligned) conditions for 
investors who were in the Aligned (Misaligned) conditions when providing Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt. 
Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt are also included in the within-participant data such that every investor who was 
in the between-participants Aligned or Misaligned conditions has responses for the within-participant Aligned, 
Misaligned, and Control conditions. 
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the beginning of the political spending disclosures in the conditions where progressive spending 
or conservative spending is disclosed as mentioned above.14 For Voluntary disclosure, the 
introductory clause “Although not required to do so by any reporting standard,” is added before 
the disclosure (see Appendix A for an example of Voluntary disclosure). For Mandatory 
disclosure, the introductory clause “Citing a legal requirement to disclose its political spending,” 
is added before the disclosure. For Unspecified disclosure, there is no introductory clause to 
indicate whether the disclosure was required or made voluntarily. This manipulation is not used in 
the between-participants Control condition because no political spending is disclosed.  
The manipulation of the introductory clause creates the three disclosure conditions—
Mandatory, Voluntary, and Unspecified—used to test my research question, which asks whether 
mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of corporate political spending differentially affects 
investors’ use of such information. The introductory clause is the only difference across the 
Mandatory, Voluntary, and Unspecified conditions; all other aspects of the experiment are 
identical to those described earlier, and the Aligned and Misaligned conditions are formed within 
each of the Mandatory, Voluntary, and Unspecified conditions in the same manner as described 
earlier. 
                                                 
14 As mentioned before, these spending conditions ultimately translate into the Aligned or Misaligned conditions, 
depending on the political identity of the individual investor. 
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3.5 RESULTS  
Before describing the tests of my hypotheses, I briefly describe the main result relating to my 
research question, which asks whether voluntary versus mandatory disclosure differentially affects 
investors’ use of disclosed corporate political spending information. As reported in more detail 
later, my results for H1 and H2 hold when controlling for voluntary versus mandatory disclosure.15  
Therefore, I combine the data from the Voluntary, Mandatory, and Unspecified disclosure 
conditions to test H1 and H2. 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1  
H1 predicts that investors will value a company higher as an investment when its political spending 
is aligned with the investors’ political identities than when its political spending is misaligned with 
the investors’ political identities. Panels A and B of Figure 1 show the means for the between-
participants dependent variables Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt for the Aligned, Misaligned, 
and Control conditions. The pattern of these means provides initial support for H1. Panels A and 
B of Figure 2 show disaggregation of the means of these variables within the Aligned and 
Misaligned conditions by investors’ political identities and the company’s political spending. 
Notably, the disaggregated means do not differ significantly within the Aligned condition and 
within the Misaligned condition. That is, the pattern of means for both dependent variables is 
                                                 
15 In untabulated analyses, I control for possible main effects of Voluntary and Mandatory disclosure as well as 
interaction effects of Voluntary X Alignment and Mandatory X Alignment. None of these effects is statistically 
significant. 
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unaffected by investors’ political identities, ruling out concerns that support for H1 could be driven 
by the reactions of progressive investors only or conservative investors only.       
 
Figure 1. Means of Between-Participants Dependent Variables 
 
Panel A: Attractiveness 
 
 
Panel B: Investment 
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Figure 2. Means of Between-Participants Dependent Variables by Political Identity and Spending Type 
 
Panel A: Attractiveness 
 
 
Panel B: Investment 
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I begin my formal analysis by conducting separate 1 x 3 ANOVAs for Attractivenessbt and 
Investmentbt comparing across the between-participant Aligned, Misaligned, and Control 
conditions. As reported in Table 2, Panel A, the results show that there are significant differences 
across the three conditions for both Attractivenessbt (F = 16.61, p < .0001) and Investmentbt (F = 
5.54, p < .005). To test H1, I conduct a planned pairwise comparison of the Aligned and Misaligned 
conditions for both Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt.16 As reported in Table 2, Panel B, I find that 
the means for both Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt are significantly higher (p < .001 and p = 
.012, respectively) in the Aligned condition than in the Misaligned condition. Thus, consistent with 
H1, investors whose political identities are aligned with the company’s political spending assessed 
the company as a more attractive investment and chose to invest more in the company compared 
to investors whose political identities are misaligned with the company’s political spending.  
                                                 
16 I report all pairwise comparison results using the Bonferroni correction. 
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Table 2. Analyses for Hypothesis 1 
Panel A: Analyses of Variance 
Dependent 
Variable Source of Variation Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Statistic p-valuea 
Attractiveness Condition 177.16 2 88.58 16.61 < 0.0001 Error 848.14 159 5.33   
Investment Condition 1055249.42 2 527624.71 5.54 0.0047 Error 15144750.60 159 95250.00   
 
 
Panel B: Planned Pairwise Comparisons 
Compared Conditions Mean Difference p-valuea,b 
Aligned versus Misaligned   
Attractiveness 2.10 < 0.001 
Investment $154 0.012 
Aligned versus Control   
Attractiveness -0.11 1.00 
Investment -$32 1.00 
Misaligned versus Control   
Attractiveness -2.21 < 0.001 
Investment -$186 0.031 
 
a All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
b I report all pairwise comparison results using the Bonferroni correction. 
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Next, I examine whether the results for H1 are due to positive effects on investors’ 
decisions in the Aligned condition, negative effects on investors’ decisions in the Misaligned 
condition, or both. I conduct planned pairwise comparisons between the Aligned and Control 
conditions and between the Misaligned and Control conditions for both Attractivenessbt and 
Investmentbt. If investors’ decisions are affected both positively by being politically aligned and 
negatively by being politically misaligned, I would expect that the means of both Attractivenessbt 
and Investmentbt in the Control condition would lie between those of the Aligned and Misaligned 
conditions. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, Panel A, the means of both Attractivenessbt and 
Investmentbt in the Control condition are very similar to those in the Aligned condition, but 
noticeably higher than those in the Misaligned condition.  
The results of the pairwise comparisons reported in Table 2, Panel B, confirm the pattern 
noted above. That is, there are no significant differences for either Attractivenessbt (p = 1.00) or 
Investmentbt (p = 1.00) between the Aligned and Control conditions, but both Attractivenessbt (p < 
.001) and Investmentbt (p = .031) are significantly lower in the Misaligned condition than in the 
Control condition. These results show that the reason H1 is supported is that the attractiveness 
assessments and investment amounts are lower for investors whose political identities are 
misaligned with the company’s political spending than for investors in the Control condition who 
were not provided with any political spending disclosure. That is, the effect of political spending 
disclosure is negative and only present among investors whose political identities are misaligned 
with the company’s political spending.    
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3.5.2 Hypothesis 2  
H2 predicts investors will consciously value a company higher when its political spending is 
aligned with the investors’ political identities than when its political spending is misaligned with 
the investors’ political identities. In other words, H2 predicts that the results reported for H1 reflect 
investors’ conscious decisions rather than subconscious biases. If this is the case, the pattern of 
responses seen in the between-participants data supporting H1 should continue in the within-
participant data. That is, investors should continue to make lower attractiveness assessments and 
invest smaller amounts when the company’s political spending is misaligned with their political 
identities than when the company’s political spending is aligned with their political identities or 
when no political spending is disclosed. These differences across conditions should persist because 
in the within-participant case each investor responds to all three conditions and can see clearly that 
only the type or presence of political spending changes across conditions. Therefore, if investors 
consciously use information about the company’s political spending they will respond in the same 
way they did in the between-participants conditions. 
Figure 3 shows the means for the within-participant dependent variables, Attractiveness 
and Investment, for the Aligned, Misaligned, and Control conditions.17 The pattern of results in 
Figure 3 for the within-participant data is the same as that for the corresponding Figure 1 for the 
between-participants data.  Likewise, the pattern in Figure 4, which shows disaggregation of the 
means of the within-participant dependent variables by investors’ political identities, is the same 
                                                 
17 The within-participant dependent variables for the Aligned and Misaligned conditions include the between-
participant dependent variables, Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt. To compose the Aligned and Misaligned 
conditions for each participant in the within-participant case, I must use participants’ responses to Attractivenessbt 
and Investmentbt as well as Attractivenesswi and Investmentwi. The within-participant Control condition is 
comprised of participants’ responses for AttractivenessC and InvestmentC.    
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as that in the corresponding Figure 2 for the between-participants data. The fact that the patterns 
are the same for the between-participant and within-participant data suggests that the investors are 
consciously using the disclosed political spending information in their investment decisions. 
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Figure 3. Means of Within-Participants Dependent Variables 
 
Panel A: Attractiveness 
 
 
Panel B: Investment 
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Figure 4. Means of Within-Participants Dependent Variables by Political Identity and Spending Type 
 
Panel A: Attractiveness 
 
 
Panel B: Investment 
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To formally test H2, I conduct the same analyses I used to test H1, except that now I use 
repeated-measures ANOVAs because I am testing within-participant data.18 I again conduct 
separate 1 x 3 ANOVAs of Attractiveness and Investment comparing across the Aligned, 
Misaligned, and Control conditions.  The results of the repeated measures ANOVAs reported in 
Table 3, Panel A, show that, as for the between-participant data, there are significant differences 
across the three conditions for both Attractiveness (F = 68.9, p < .001) and Investment (F = 57.7, 
p < .001).19 Consistent with the between-participants results reported earlier for H1, a planned 
pairwise comparison reported in Table 3, Panel B, shows that the means for both Attractiveness (p 
< .001) and Investment (p < .001) are significantly higher in the Aligned condition than in the 
Misaligned condition. This suggests that, consistent with H2, investors consciously value a 
company higher when its political spending is aligned with the investors’ political identities than 
when its political spending is misaligned with the investors’ political identities.  
Also, consistent with the between-participant results for H1, means for Attractiveness (p = 
.164) and Investment (p = 1.00) are not significantly different between the Aligned and Control 
conditions, and means for Attractiveness (p < .001) and Investment (p < .001) are significantly 
lower in the Misaligned condition than in the Control condition. Thus, all results for the within-
participant data parallel the results for H1 using the between-participant data. These results are 
consistent with investors consciously using the company’s political spending information when 
making their attractiveness assessments and choosing their investment amounts. 
                                                 
18 The 26 participants in the between-participant Control condition were not asked to assess the company with 
political spending of any kind. Thus, only the 136 participants from the between-participant Aligned and 
Misaligned conditions are included in the within-participant analyses. 
19 The significance of these results does not differ when using various corrections for data that violates the 
assumption of sphericity, as mine does. 
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Table 3. Analyses for Hypothesis 2 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance 
Dependent 
Variable Source of Variation Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Statistic p-valuea,b 
Attractiveness Condition 448.83 2 224.41 68.92 < 0.001 Error 879.17 270 3.26   
Investment Condition 3607254.91 2 1803627.45 57.70 < 0.001 Error 8439411.77 270 31257.08   
 
 
Panel B: Planned Pairwise Comparisons 
Compared Conditions Mean Difference p-valuea,c 
Aligned versus Misaligned   
Attractiveness 2.36 < 0.001 
Investment $204 < 0.001 
Aligned versus Control   
Attractiveness 0.30 0.164 
Investment $10 1.000 
Misaligned versus Control   
Attractiveness -2.06 < 0.001 
Investment -$194 < 0.001 
 
a All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
b Statistical significance does not change if Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt, or Lower-bound corrections are used. 
c I report all pairwise comparison results using the Bonferroni correction 
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3.5.3 Research Question  
My research question asks whether and how voluntary versus mandatory disclosure affects how 
investors use information about corporate political spending. As mentioned above, the 
manipulations I use to address this question do not have a statistically significant effect on my 
results for H1 and H2, so I report the previous analyses having collapsed across the disclosure 
conditions of Voluntary, Mandatory, and Unspecified.20  
Figure 5, Panel A, shows the means of the between-participants dependent variables 
Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt for the Aligned and Misaligned conditions in each of the 
disclosure conditions of Voluntary, Mandatory, and Unspecified.21 In each of the disclosure 
conditions, the pattern of means is consistent with H1. This is preliminary evidence that regardless 
of whether disclosure is voluntary, mandatory, or unspecified, investors whose political identities 
are aligned with the company’s political spending value the company higher than investors whose 
political identities are not aligned with the company’s political spending. 
                                                 
20 In separate analyses (untabulated), I consider whether H1 and H2 hold within each disclosure condition 
independently. All results for H1 and H2 remain statistically significant and directionally consistent except for the 
results for H1 regarding Investment in the Voluntary condition. That result remains directionally consistent but is 
not statistically significant.    
21 The disclosure condition manipulations are not present in the between-participants Control condition because 
there was no disclosure of political spending. 
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Figure 5. Means by Disclosure Condition for Research Question 
 
Panel A: Means of Between-Participant Dependent Variables 
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Panel B: Means of Within-Participant Dependent Variables 
 
 
 68 
To formally test whether voluntary versus mandatory disclosure affects investors’ use of 
corporate political spending information, I first conduct the same ANOVAs for Attractivenessbt 
and Investmentbt as I did in testing H1 except that I now include the disclosure conditions as 
another factor. Because these disclosure conditions were not present in the between-participants 
Control condition, where there was no disclosure of political spending, the Control condition is 
not included in the ANOVAs. Panels A and B of Table 4 show the results of these ANOVAs for 
Attractivenessbt and Investmentbt, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Analyses for Hypothesis 1 Controlling for Disclosure Condition 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance, Dependent Variable is Attractivenessbt 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Statistic p-valuea 
Intercept 6361.86 1 6361.86 1061.64 < 0.001 
Alignment 150.21 1 150.21 25.07 < 0.001 
Disclosure 9.57 2 4.79 0.80 0.452 
Alignment x Disclosure 0.37 2 0.19 0.03 0.970 
Error 779.03 130 5.99   
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance, Dependent Variable is Investmentbt 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Statistic p-valuea 
Intercept 19781702.00 1 19781702.00 198.79 < 0.001 
Alignment 905290.42 1 905290.42 9.10 0.003 
Disclosure 98705.98 2 49352.99 0.50 0.610 
Alignment x Disclosure 150838.89 2 75419.44 0.76 0.471 
Error 12936339.71 130 99510.31   
 
a All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
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Neither ANOVA shows a significant main effect nor a significant interaction effect of the 
disclosure conditions. For Attractivenessbt, the difference between the Aligned and Misaligned 
conditions remains significant (F = 25.07, p < .001), while the main effect (F = 0.80, p = .452) and 
interaction effect (F = .03, p = .970) of the disclosure conditions are not significant. Likewise, for 
Investmentbt, the difference between the Aligned and Misaligned conditions remains significant (F 
= 9.10, p < .01), while the main effect (F = 0.50, p = .610) and interaction effect (F = 0.76, p = 
.471) of the disclosure conditions are not significant. These results suggest that voluntary versus 
mandatory disclosure does not affect how investors use corporate political spending information.   
Figure 5, Panel B, shows the means of the within-participant dependent variables of 
Attractiveness and Investment across the within-participant Aligned, Misaligned, and Control 
conditions in each of the disclosure conditions. In each of the disclosure conditions, the pattern of 
means is consistent with H2. This is preliminary evidence that regardless of whether disclosure is 
voluntary, mandatory, or unspecified, investors whose political identities are aligned with the 
company’s political spending consciously value the company higher than investors whose political 
identities are not aligned with the company’s political spending. 
To formally test whether voluntary versus mandatory disclosure affects whether investors 
consciously use corporate political spending information, I now conduct the same repeated-
measures ANOVAs for the within-participant dependent variables of Attractiveness and 
Investment as I did in testing H2 except that I now include the disclosure conditions as a between-
participants factor. Panels A and B of Table 5 show the results of these ANOVAs for 
Attractiveness and Investment, respectively. 
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Table 5. Analyses for Hypothesis 2 Controlling for Disclosure Condition 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance, Dependent Variable is Attractiveness 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares d.f. 
Mean 
Square F-Statistic p-valuea,b 
Aligned/Misaligned/Control (AMC) 446.66 2 223.33 68.92 < 0.001 
AMC x Disclosure 17.21 4 4.30 1.33 0.260 
Error 861.97 266 3.24   
 
 
Panel B: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance, Dependent Variable is Investment 
Source of Variation 
Sum of 
Squares d.f. Mean Square F-Statistic p-valuea,b 
Aligned/Misaligned/Control (AMC) 3612705.01 2 1806352.50 57.92 < 0.001 
AMC x Disclosure 142962.59 4 35740.65 1.15 0.335 
Error 8296449.17 266 31189.66   
 
a All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
b Statistical significance does not change if Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt, or Lower-bound corrections are 
used. 
 
 
Neither repeated-measures ANOVA shows a significant interaction effect of the disclosure 
conditions with the Aligned, Misaligned, and Control conditions. For Attractiveness, the 
differences among the within-participant Aligned, Misaligned, and Control conditions remain 
significant (F = 68.92, p < .001), while the interaction effect (F = 1.33, p = .260) of the disclosure 
conditions is not significant. Likewise, for Investment, the differences among the Aligned, 
Misaligned, and Control conditions remain significant (F = 57.92, p < .001), while the interaction 
effect (F = 1.15, p = .335) of the disclosure conditions is not significant. Separate, untabulated tests 
of the between-participants effects of the disclosure conditions in the within-participant data also 
show non-significant effects on Attractiveness (F = 0.01, p = .991) and Investment (F = 0.35, p = 
.706). Taken together, these results suggest that voluntary versus mandatory disclosure does not 
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affect whether investors consciously use corporate political spending information. In summary, I 
find no evidence that voluntary versus mandatory disclosure has an effect on how investors use 
corporate political spending information. 
However, my manipulation of disclosure condition was subtle, and it is possible that 
investors did not consider whether the political spending information was being disclosed 
voluntarily or not. Unfortunately, I did not include a manipulation check for disclosure condition 
in my study, so it is impossible to tell whether investors noticed the introductory clauses in the 
disclosures indicating voluntary or mandatory disclosure. To address this concern, I have run a 
subsequent trial of my study using only the Voluntary and Mandatory disclosure conditions and 
including a manipulation check to determine whether participants notice the disclosure condition 
manipulation.22 In a sample of 19, I find that 15 participants, or 79%, correctly identify whether 
the disclosure was required or not.23 In this trial, I included both investors and non-investors 
because I am only concerned with whether they notice the disclosure condition. All four 
participants who answered the manipulation check question incorrectly indicated that they did not 
think information about whether the disclosure was required had been provided. Although the 
sample in this trial is small, it does show a majority of participants understood whether or not the 
disclosure was required after receiving the same information as the participants in the main study.     
                                                 
22 All other aspects of my experimental design remain the same except that I omit the Unspecified disclosure 
condition from the trial because there is no mention of disclosure regime for participants to notice. I also omit the 
between-participants Control condition from the trial as there is no disclosure in that condition. 
23 The trial included 20 participants, but one was excluded for re-entering the study after failing the initial 
manipulation check question regarding spending type. This is consistent with the screening protocol I used in my 
main study. 
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3.5.4 Additional Analysis 
In the development of H1, I explained that previously documented effects of investors’ politics on 
their investment choices could be evidence of politically-derived tastes for assets or could be 
evidence of different financial expectations resulting from investors’ personal political identities. 
To explore this issue, I designed my experiment to help sort out which of these underlying reasons 
drives my findings regarding investors’ reactions to disclosed corporate political spending 
information. 
Specifically, I asked participants if they had considered whether the disclosed political 
spending would affect the future financial performance of the company.24 60% (81/136) replied, 
“Yes;” 40% (55/136) replied, “No.” Controlling for the response to this question in additional 
analyses for H1 and H2 does not change the significance of the predicted effects, and the control 
variable is not significant at conventional levels in any of the analyses (untabulated).25,26 That is, 
H1 and H2 both hold regardless of whether participants considered any future financial impact of 
the disclosed political spending. This suggests that some investors acted only on their tastes 
regarding the political spending while others may have had differing financial expectations for the 
company because of its political spending. 
To ascertain whether participants who responded, “Yes,” to the question above actually 
held different financial expectations for the company based on its disclosed political spending, I 
                                                 
24 The 26 participants in the between-participants control condition were not asked this question because they did 
not see any disclosure of political spending. 
25 To re-test H1 with this question as a control variable, I ran the ANOVAs previously used for H1 but with an 
additional, dichotomous factor coded “0” for “No” and “1” for “Yes.” As noted in footnote 21, the between-
participants control condition did not have this question, so these ANOVAs only test the Aligned and Misaligned 
conditions against each other. 
26 To re-test H2 with this question as a control variable, I ran the repeated-measures ANOVAs previously used for 
H2 but with an additional, dichotomous between-participants factor coded “0” for “No” and “1” for “Yes.” 
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asked those participants to provide their assessment of how they believed the future financial 
performance of the company would be affected when it disclosed political spending to The Fund 
for a Conservative America and when it disclosed political spending to The Fund for a Progressive 
America. Participants responded on an 11-point scale from “Very Negatively” (1) to “Very 
Positively” (11) with a midpoint of “No Effect” (6).  
Interestingly, 17% (14) of the 81 participants who had said, “Yes,” to the prior question 
indicated that they expected “No Effect.”27 Adding these participants to those who said, “No,” to 
the prior question suggests that roughly half of the participants acted only on their tastes when 
valuing the company lower if it had political spending misaligned with their political identities. 
Nonetheless, the other half of participants indicate that they did expect an effect of the disclosed 
political spending on the future financial performance of the company.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Tests of my hypotheses provide evidence that investors consciously use disclosed corporate 
political spending information in their investment decisions. Specifically, investors whose political 
identities are not aligned with a company’s political spending assess the company to be less 
attractive and invest less in the company than investors whose political identities are aligned with 
the company’s political spending or who do not receive information about the company’s political 
spending. Investors continue to use political spending information in this manner even after they 
                                                 
27 These data are for the “Fund” participants saw first, between-participants. The data for this question regarding 
the “Fund” participants saw second, within-participant, is similar with 14% (11) of the 81 participants indicating 
“No Effect.” 
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see that a change in the presence or type of political spending is the only change across scenarios, 
providing evidence that investors consciously use the information rather than using it 
unintentionally because of a subconscious bias. My results also provide evidence that investors’ 
use of political spending disclosures in their decisions is unaffected by whether the disclosure is 
voluntary or mandatory.  
Further, my results suggest that investors use disclosed corporate political spending 
information in different ways. Some investors expect that the political spending will have financial 
implications for the company, while other investors do not consider any financial impact of the 
spending but use the information in their decisions nonetheless. Thus, it appears that the negative 
effect of being misaligned with a company’s political spending could stem from different 
rationales in different investors, with some perceiving an economic rationale for their choices and 
others acting only on their tastes.        
These findings provide evidence for regulators regarding whether to require corporations 
to disclose their political spending. The finding that investors consciously use disclosed corporate 
political spending information when making investment decisions indicates that they consider such 
information useful. Combining this finding with the additional finding that investors use the 
information in the same way regardless of whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory suggests 
that investors could benefit from mandatory disclosure of corporate political spending. 
Furthermore, corporate political spending disclosure decreases investment by investors with 
misaligned political identities and does not increase investment by investors with aligned political 
identities. As such, corporations have an incentive to avoid disclosing their political spending 
unless a regulator requires it.      
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My study also extends the literature on the effects of political influences on investment 
decisions. Although prior studies show that individual investors become more optimistic when 
their preferred party is in power (Bonaparte et al. 2017) and money managers invest in specific 
industries or types of companies based on their political preferences (Chin and Parwada 2009, 
Hong and Kostovetsky 2012), my study is the first to document that the nature of the disclosed 
political spending of an individual firm can affect how investors view that firm as an investment.  
Finally, my study extends prior results showing that investment decisions are more affected 
by negative political considerations than by positive political considerations. Consistent with Hong 
and Kostovetsky, who find that Democrat money managers make less investment in “socially 
irresponsible” firms, and with Kaustia and Torstila (2011), who find that left-wing voters and 
politicians in Finland are less likely to participate in the stock market based on their negative views 
of capitalism, I find that investors whose political views are misaligned with the political spending 
of a company assess that company as a less attractive investment and invest less in the company. 
Also, I find that this effect holds not only for investors with progressive political identities, as seen 
in prior studies, but also for investors with conservative political identities. 
My study has several limitations that could be addressed in future research. First, I conduct 
my experiment with non-professional investors and find strong evidence that these investors 
consciously use corporate political spending information in their decisions. However, although 
prior studies suggest that professional investors also exhibit some political preferences in their 
decisions, my results cannot be directly extrapolated to professional investors who may behave 
differently for a variety of reasons. Therefore, a follow-up study using financial analysts and/or 
fund managers to see whether they behave similarly to non-professional investors would be useful. 
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Second, my study is limited to investors’ reactions to corporate political spending 
information and does not address the managerial decisions behind such spending. It is possible, 
and intuitive, that managers would anticipate investors’ use of corporate political spending 
information and adapt strategically. That is, managers could make political spending and 
disclosure choices based on their perceptions of their firm’s investors. Also, managers may make 
different corporate political spending choices under a mandatory disclosure rule. Further research 
on the managerial decision-making behind firms’ political spending would thus help regulators 
and standard setters better understand the consequences of any potential disclosure rules. 
Finally, my experiment does not take into account many factors that exist in the real-world. 
I manipulate corporate political spending as either progressive or conservative, but firms often 
spend on both sides. My results cannot specifically address how investors may react to more 
complex disclosures with political spending supporting many different groups. Also, investors’ 
reactions to corporate political spending may vary based on firm characteristics that I held constant 
in my study. I chose to use a grocery store chain in my experiment to minimize the influence of 
the company’s industry on investors’ decisions. However, investors could react differently to the 
political spending of a major defense contractor, for example. In that same vein, clear links 
between a company’s political spending and its business interests could change how investors 
evaluate that spending. Thus, there remains much to be learned about how investors use corporate 
political spending information, and future research could explain nuances not captured in my 
study. 
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4.0  FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES RELATED TO CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPENDING 
In my study, I examined investor reaction to corporate political spending (CPS) by a single firm 
that either had conservative or progressive political spending. Also, my participants were non-
professional investors, and participants’ investment decisions were not linked to actual economic 
outcomes in my experiment. Although my design allowed me to establish that investors react to 
the disclosure of CPS, there are a number of important open questions that could be addressed in 
future research. 
First, it is not uncommon for firms to have CPS that spans both sides of the aisle. For 
example, Exxon Mobil has supported both Republicans and Democrats with its CPS in recent 
years.28 A natural extension of my study would be to run an additional condition wherein the firm 
spends on both conservative and progressive groups. The results of my study suggest that 
investors’ reactions to CPS are limited to negativity toward CPS with which they disagree, so it 
would be interesting to see if that negative effect is still present when a firm also has CPS with 
which the investor agrees. If the negative effect is still present, it would provide evidence that the 
results of my dissertation study are robust to more complex CPS scenarios. If the negative effect 
is no longer present, it would suggest that CPS with which investors agree helps to ameliorate their 
negative reactions to CPS with which they disagree. These findings would have implications for 
                                                 
28 For some details on Exxon Mobil’s CPS, see http://www.trackyourcompany.org/company-
details.html?Contributions_Org_ID=415. 
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regulators in their consideration of disclosure requirements and would also be relevant for firm 
managers when making CPS decisions.  
Second, my study showed the reactions of non-professional investors to CPS, but much of 
the trading volume in stock markets is directed by professional investors who possess greater 
knowledge about investing and may behave differently than the casual investor. So, it would be 
interesting to examine professional investors’ reactions to CPS. I could do this with an experiment 
similar to my prior study but including the additional condition described in the preceding 
paragraph. It may be difficult to recruit professional investors for this study, but using master’s 
students who have already completed at least level 1 of the CFA exam and have experience in 
investing would provide a more sophisticated set of participants. If the findings of the study do not 
differ from my prior study, the question would then be whether disclosures of CPS would have 
price effects in financial markets. Alternatively, if professional investors do not react to the 
disclosure of CPS, we could infer that they do not find CPS to be informative about firm value and 
that disclosures of CPS probably would not affect stock prices because professional investors 
would trade against non-professional investors and set prices without considering CPS. 
Third, a follow-up experiment using a laboratory financial market could show whether 
investors’ reactions to CPS affect their investing behavior and could also provide more information 
about the reasons for their reactions. Comparing bid and ask data across conditions would reveal 
if investors use CPS information, and comparing prices across conditions would reveal if the 
disclosure of CPS affects price. In the experimental market, I could create assets that have payoffs 
to the investors who hold them and also have payoffs to a political group. If investors’ negative 
reactions in my prior study were affective responses to the CPS, investors should have similar 
feelings in the experimental market and offer lower bids for assets that have payoffs to political 
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groups with which the investors disagree. Alternatively, if investors’ negative reactions in my prior 
study resulted from reasoning about the effects of CPS on firm value, investors would have no 
reason to bid lower for assets that have payoffs to political groups with which they disagree unless 
those payoffs affected the investors’ payoffs. I could manipulate whether the political payoffs 
affect investors’ payoffs and examine investor behavior between-participants. If investors do not 
lower their bids in response to assets that have disagreeable political payoffs when those payoffs 
do not affect their own payoffs, it would support a financial motivation for the negative effect in 
my prior study.  
If investors lower their bids even when their own payoffs are unaffected in the study 
described in the previous paragraph, it would support an affective argument for the negative effect 
in my dissertation study. Then I could introduce another manipulation to test the robustness of the 
effect in the presence of financial incentives. If I provide a mix of high- and low-paying assets 
such that in some markets only the high-paying assets have payoffs to one of the political groups, 
conservative or progressive, some investors will be forced to choose between buying low-paying, 
politically-neutral assets or buying high-paying assets that are linked to a political group with 
which they disagree. The difference in the yields investors are willing to accept between these 
assets would provide some evidence about the strength of the negative effect of misaligned CPS. 
Fourth, there could be an interaction effect between firm type and CPS such that investors 
may not react in the same way across firms. Coates (2012) and Hadani and Schuler (2013) both 
provide evidence that CPS is not detrimental, and may be beneficial, to firms reliant on government 
regulation and/or spending. Considering this, it would be useful to re-examine the effect from my 
prior study in the context of different industries. This could be achieved by running a similar 
experiment to the one in my study but with firms in the defense and utilities industries. This 
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manipulation could also be implemented in the experimental market study mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. The effect from my prior study may be diminished or absent in scenarios 
where a firm stands to benefit from CPS through reduced regulations or increased government 
spending. 
Fifth, the existing literature is mixed regarding managers’ motivations for CPS, with some 
studies supporting the idea that CPS is a strategic investment and other studies condemning CPS 
as an agency cost. For example, Cooper et al. (2010), Correia (2014), Akey (2015) and Brown et 
al. (2015) all find evidence of firms benefiting from CPS, whereas Coates (2012), Aggarwal et al. 
(2012), and Hadani and Schuler (2013) find evidence that CPS lowers firm value. My dissertation 
study does not address managerial decisions about CPS, but examining these decisions could be 
useful to regulators and investors. Both regulators and investors would likely welcome information 
about managers’ intentions concerning CPS, as the agency cost explanation for CPS would make 
it unacceptable. Furthermore, if managers conduct CPS to benefit their firms, regulators would 
probably also want to understand how the firms derive benefits from CPS and whether those 
benefits occur through legal and ethical pathways. Related, there are also mixed results regarding 
how the disclosure of CPS is received by the market. Baloria et al. (2015) and Prabhat and Primo 
(2017) show negative effects of CPS disclosure on stock returns, but DeBoskey et al. (2017) shows 
that firms with more transparent disclosure of CPS enjoy lower costs of debt. To address this, I 
could conduct an experiment to examine managers’ motivations for CPS and how their decisions 
about CPS may change if disclosure is required or expected. 
Sixth, it is unclear how other stakeholders like suppliers and customers react to CPS and 
whether and how managers consider their reactions when making decisions about CPS. 
Anecdotally, customers have responded very negatively to disclosed CPS by Target and to the 
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personal political spending by one of the owners of L.L. Bean (Torres-Spelliscy 2010, Victor 
2017). With events like these being publicly recognized in the popular press, it is likely that 
managers at least consider how their firms’ CPS would be viewed by current and potential 
customers before deciding on CPS matters. 
In all, CPS and its disclosure are interesting and pertinent topics for accounting research 
as the legal environment in the United States continues to allow corporations to spend their funds 
to influence political outcomes without requiring disclosure of that spending. Many questions 
remain about how investors would use disclosed CPS information if it were available and about 
why and how managers decide to engage in CPS. My dissertation study provides a first step 
toward acknowledging that investors use CPS disclosures in their decisions and also opens a 
number of additional questions.     
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APPENDIX: EXAMPLE FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT  
Example of Company Information (Progressive Spending, Voluntary Disclosure) 
 
Today you will be making investment decisions regarding a company. You will have access 
to information regarding the company’s business as well as its most recent income 
statement. You will rate the attractiveness of the company as an investment and indicate 
how much of a hypothetical investment portfolio you would invest in the company. 
  
The Great Grocer Company owns a chain of grocery stores throughout the United States. 
With stores in 35 states and over 2,700 locations, Great Grocer has been in the grocery 
business for over a century and has a loyal customer base in many of its markets. It has 
historically positioned itself as a low-cost provider of food and basic household items, but 
recently it has renovated some of its stores in higher-income areas to compete with the 
larger, upscale chains that have become more popular in those areas. 
  
Sales have grown consistently in the past five years with an annual average growth rate of 
six percent. Sales at existing stores grew at an annual average of nearly four percent over 
the same period, while the Company’s newer stores performed well and accounted for the 
remainder of its sales growth. Although there were increased costs associated with the new 
store openings and the renovations of some older stores, Great Grocer has increased its 
net income by an annual average of about four percent over the past five years. 
  
Great Grocer Company’s income statement for the most recent year is presented below (in 
millions of dollars): 
 
  
Although not required to do so by any reporting standard, Great Grocer explains in the 
notes to its financial statements that $400,000 of its $20,758 million in operating expenses 
reflects political spending in the form of contributions it made to the Fund for a Progressive 
America. 
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According to its website, “The Fund for a Progressive America is a 501(c)(4) not-for-profit 
organization that advocates on behalf of Americans with progressive views. We support 
issues important to our members such as fair trade policies and actively-engaged 
government. We also support candidates for elected office who understand that progressive 
policies are vital for the country’s enduring success.”     
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